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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents the problem of displacement and
resettlement of people affected by developmental projects in
India. At present there is no national policy on resettlement
and efforts to resettle people so far have proven ineffective
and myopic.
The study examines three cases of large-scale water
resource development projects. The first case is of Ukai Dam
in the state of Gujarat, where people were resettled and an
attempt is made to evaluate the effectivenss of resettlement
planning. The second case presents the Koel-Karo Hydro-
electric Project in the state of Bihar. The state government
does not have a policy for resettlement and people have
thwarted the land acquisition for the project. The third
case, the Sardar Sarovar Narmada Project in the state of
Gujarat is very recent and people have compelled the govern-
ment to formulate a resettlement policy.
The major problems of the resettlement practice are iden-
tified as inadequacy of the Land Acquisition Act to deal with
compensation, scarcity of land for resettlement, lack of
public participation, anomaly in distribution of project bene-
fits, and lack of developmental inputs in resettled villages.
These findings are used to formulate the policy which recom-
mends major policy choices, major options' for resettlement
plan, developmental options, and mechanisms for implementa-
tion.
Thesis Supervisor: Lawrence E. Susskind
Title: Professor of urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
The present study attempts to understand the problems of
resettlement of people affected by large-scale water resource
development projects in India. At present there is no reset-
tlement policy at the national level and in absence of such a
policy each state has its own piecemeal approach towards
resettlement. The only legal power with the government to
handle resettlement is the Land Acquisition Act, enacted by
the British in 1894.
This study examines three cases of large water resource
development projects, namely 1) Ukai Dam Project in the state
of Gujarat 2) Koel-Karo Hydroelectric Project in the state of
Bihar and 3) Sardar Sarovar Narmada Dam Project in the state
of Gujarat.
The Ukai Dam was constructed in 1972 and it affected 170
villages and 16,080 tribal families. Government resettled
these tribals by clearing forest but little efforts were made
to make people self-sufficient and economically productive.
Traditionally land based people were not given enough agricul-
tural land in the new location. The result was frustration in
the tribal community. Several families abandoned their
villages and migrated to urban areas to become slum dwellers.
The Koel-Karo Project was initiated as early as 1973 but
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the affected people refused to give up their land unless the
government arranged for proper resettlement. The government
failed to formulate effective resettlement policy and as a
result the project is now almost abandoned. People have shown
their determination and have asserted that proper compensation
and resettlement strategy are essential prerequisites for such
a development work.
The Sardar Sarovar Narmada Project is a recent and the
most controversial one. The construction of the dam has just
started. Totally 68,000 people will be affected in the three
states namely, states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and
Maharashtra. The interstate dispute was resolved by a special
Tribunal and a resettlement policy was announced in 1978. The
World Bank, financing the project, also emphasized proper
resettlement and have given guidelines for the same.
It has been observed that often government machinery is
not adequate to dea-l with the massive resettlement work.
There is a dearth of land where resettlement can take place
and there is no developmental inputs to boost economic oppor-
tunities for the affected people. There is no public partici-
pation in the entire planning process and decisions are always
imposed on people without taking them into confidence. Hence
effective resettlement policy should aim at offering 1) policy
choices 2) alternatives for land 3) development options and 4)
administrative mechanism to allow public participation. The
9
study proposes resettlement council at district level where
participants will be drawn from the affected communities,
voluntary agencies, social workers, architects, planners, and
administrators.
The first chapter presents an overview of the problems of
displacement, resettlement, and compensation strategy and
identifies the objectives of the study. The second chapter
discusses the history of water resource development in India,
the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and its limitations, and the
efforts of the government towards resettlement policy. The
third, fourth, and fifth chapters present the case studies of
Ukai Dam Project, Koel-Karo Project and Sardar Sarovar Narmada
Project respectively. The sixth chapter identifies key
findings and proposes framework for resettlement policy. The
study concludes with a note that development is essential for
the welfare of the nation but it should not be done at the
cost of poor people. The Sardar Sarovar Narmada Project will
offer great lessons to social scientists, administrators, and
planners. The outcome and experience of this project will be
of great use in formulating resettlement policy in India.
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CHAPTER 1
DAMS AND DISPLACEMENT: AN OVERVIEW
This chapter introduces the problems of large-scale
development projects in developing and developed world as
well. It discusses the limitations of cost benefit approach
and identifies the objectives of the study.
Several attempts have been made in the past to study the
problems of displacement caused by irrigation projects. Here
the views of various research scholars are presented on the
aspects of resettlement and impact of displacement.
1:1:0 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT VERSES ENVIRONMENT
The development in third world contries essentially meant
economic growth. Economic development has been considered as
a principal means of fostering well-being. In striving for
economic growth, developing nations have emphasized maximum
exploitation of their natural resources. It may be that such
a strategy, in fact, runs counter to the desired objective of
fostering well-being.
It is a common practice to evaluate economic development
projects using the benefit-cost approach. This approach
measures the efficient allocation of resources. A project is
11
considered desirable if the total benefits in the long run
exceed the costs of construction and management. Unfortunate-
ly this approach tends to downplay important distributional
impacts. Indeed, development projects make some people net
gainers and others net losers (Evans and Wings 1977). More-
over, cost-benefit analysis usually overlooks important social
and environmental costs. Increased incomes and employment
opportunities are over-emphasized while possible increased
rates of crime, breaking up of neighborhoods and family rela-
tions, and adverse environmental impact, is are often not
featured in. (Leistritz and Murdock 1981).
Who bears that cost and who gets the benefits from a
development project varies with the nature of the project.
Certain projects create fewer adverse impacts. Large-scale
water development projects, however, create substantial
adverse impacts. Some analysts have concluded that if all the
relevant social and environmental costs were properly tallied
in the cost, many large-scale water projects would be
infeasible. The feasibility studies, according to these
critics, are merely an "eye-wash" securing monetary sanctions
from the financing agencies.
One key source of controversy in constructing large dams
and reservoirs is that large numbers of people - indeed whole
communities - may be forced out of their homes. Those who
must move shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs,
while sharing in a very small fraction of the total benefit.
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In many cases these people become worse off once they are
displaced. One group's gain, therefore, becomes the direct
loss of another in the society. (Gosling, 1979).
During the last three decades, hundreds of dams of
varying size have been constructed in many developing
countries. These dams have stimulated economic growth by
lowering the cost of electricity, improving irrigation
systems, enhancing flood control, and easing navigation. They
have generated substantial financial returns to the nations
involved, although those who have paid the highest costs have
rarely been compensated. In many developing countries the
plight of people displaced by economic development projects
has rarely been the subject of serious debate. Such develop-
ment activities have promoted the uneven distribution of
growth and encouraged inequality. (Midgley, 1984)
1:2:0 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
The overall objective of my research is to study the
impacts of large resource development projects on the people
and environment in India. My emphasis will be on populations
displaced by large-scale water resource development projects.
I am especially interested in the resettlement policies
designed to help such displaced populations. At present, in
India, the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 is the only legal
13
instrument that takes care of 'compensation' for displaced
people. I have tried to:
1) investigate displacement caused by dams and reser-
voirs in India;
2) study the present Resettlement Policy, (i.e. Land
Acquisition Act of 1894) and the problems it has created;
3) suggest improvements in India's resettlement policy
as well as strategies for mitigating the hardships of
displacement.
1:3:0 DISPLACEMENT AND RESETTLEMENT
There are several reasons which force people to migrate
against their will. The following are the three major types
of resettlement commonly observed throughout the world.
1) Resettlement due to political upheaval, e.g. wars
produce refugees, as well as other people who are uprooted
within the boundaries of the nation.
2) Resettlement due to natural disasters, e.g. earth-
quake, flood etc.
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3) Resettlement as an element of planned change, e.g.,
construction of dams, planned location of mines, industries,
docks, airports, firing ranges or weapon testing zones, etc.
There are some differences in the situations of those
forced to migrate and those who choose to move out, Decision-
making control is the key characteristic which differentiates
them. Forced migrants possess little power of decision; in
extreme cases they are totally powerless.
According to Lightfoot (1979), voluntary migration, or
abandoning of ancestral place without pressure from external
agents, is not uncommon in rural societies. When the positive
attributes of another destination "pull", negative attributes
of the home village work as "push", people tend to move. In
such cases the trauma and stress created are modest. When the
impetus is from outside, particularly as a result of govern-
mental decisions, the trauma becomes unhealingly deep
(Lightfoot, 1979). Napier (1983) believes that the initial
stage of the displacement process is most stressful because
the community is in the process of disintegration without
simultaneously being restructured.
Accounts from various countries in Africa and Asia show
that nearly one million people have been displaced by water
related projects in the last three decades. With a few excep-
tions, the large majority of those forced to move have been
low-income, low status people with very little political
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power. Governments can and do move such with little difficul-
ty (Scudder and Colson, 1982). Objections to such government
decisions have led to political confrontations. Many times
the displacees have been charged with obstructing the national
interest. Only in rare cases have there been changes in
government decisions because of oppositon by people about to
be displaced.
Some populations have been forced to move more than once.
Indians in North America, for example, have faced and are
still facing such a situation (Khera and Mariella, 1982).
1:4:0 DAMS AND DISPLACEMENT
The water resource development generally involves con-
struction of dams, anicuts and weirs on a river. History
records that as long as 5,000 years ago dams were constructed
to control rivers. In the twentieth century, however, dams
began to proliferate. In the past fifty years, most of the
major rivers in the world have been dammed. The development
of entire river basins was first accomplished in the United
States in the 1930's. Subsequently other countries followed
this path. More than two hundred major dams are now built
every year. (Petts, 1984). The increasing demand for electri-
city and water for irrigation, domestic, and industrial use,
along with improvements in construction technology have led to
the construction of larger and larger dams. Indeed, the
16
number and size of dams have now become important indicators
of development "success" in developing countries.
With the growth in number and size of dams, the extent of
inundated land area and consequent displacement are increasing
rapidly. Table 1 gives some of the important examples of
displacement in developing countries.
Table 1
EXAMPLES OF DISPLACEMENT OF PEOPLE BY WATER RELATED PROJECTS
AROUND THE WORLD
COUNTRY RESERVOIR PEOPLE DISPLACED
Nigeria Lake Kainji 212,000
Thailand 11 Projects 130,000
Egypt Lake Nasser 120,000
Ghana Lake Volta 80,000
Zambia Lake Kariba 50,000
India Ganga Valley 300,000
Source: Gosling, P. "Resettlement Losses and Compensation"
Population Resettlement in the Mekong River Basin. 1979.
1:5:0 IMPACT OF DISPLACEMENT
Over the ages humans have learned to live with
calamities, the callousness of officialdom or the
sightedness of government agents, however, are not so
accepted. Recovery from displacement caused by these
is extremely difficult to achieve.
natural
short-
readily
factors
Displacement generates hardships of various magnitude.
Stress caused by loss of familiar situations, separation from
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relatives, loss of social networks, disruption of the economic
base along with feelings of uncertainty, are felt to varying
degrees by those involved. For some these feelings are short-
lived; for others they endure for the rest of their lives.
(Scudder and Colson, 1982).
In one situation, the poor, long term residents, women
and children faced the most adverse impact of displacement
(Finsterbusch, 1980). Although some studies report the con-
trary (Napier, et al 1983), the most common finding is that
the reservoirs result in disintegration and fragmentation of
the social order.
The impact of and the response to displacement depend on
the social, cultural, economic, and educational levels of
those displaced. People with stronger social and cultural
roots feel the impact more strongly. According to Scudder and
Colson (1982) people with better education and people living
in urban setups often do better after relocation and at times
they even welcome it.
The impact of relocation is more severe in traditional
societies where kin are still the major source of security and
where the economic base is still traditional and subsistence
oriented.
On the cause of the disadvantaged position of some of
the displaced people, Dunning (1979) says: "Those disadvan-
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taged may simply be those with less compensation (money or
capital) and with smaller family labor force. Generally, they
seem to be the last to leave the reservoir region. They
obviously have the most difficulty in facing the inevitability
of resettlement. They do the least to search for new oppor-
tunities and locations and in general they allow themselves to
be moved by the events rather than by the action of their own
initiative."1
On the social and cultural fronts, the temporary vacuum
in local leadership at the community level creates new stress
among the people. They may lose their leaders either because
of geographic dispersion or for other reasons, such as mis-
trust of their leaders because of their collaboration with the
authorities, or by being isolated by the authorities for their
active resistence to relocation. In the Kariba Dam case in
Ghana the Gwembe Tonga leaders were jailed on the charge of
forming revolt. (Scudder and Colson, 1982). Similarly, in
the Zande development scheme the leaders who were fighting
against removal of their community were isolated from their
constituencies. (Reining, 1982).
Another type of social and cultural stress comes from a
major reduction in cultural activities due to a permanent loss
of behavioral patterns, economic practices, institutions, and
1. It has been found that forced relocatees are subject to
depression due to alienation from their original environment.
They find their hard earned skills of little immediate utility
in making a living in the new working environment.
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symbols. This becomes more serious where people must coexist
with unfamiliar hosts and dissimilar habitats; in which case
many economic practices, including various farming techniques
practiced by them in the earlier setting, are no longer appli-
cable. Also, small commercial operators among the displacees
do not have capital or experience to compete with already
established host competitors.
The losses of displaced people can be grouped into
technological, pecuniary, and psychological. Technological
losses are permanent losses and refer to the loss or reduction
of some factor of production such as land. Pecuniary losses
can be temporary or permanent and refer to changes in the
relative income position of the individual, such as the loss
of business suffered by a merchant whose clientele is disper-
sed by the dam. Psychological losses, which also can be
temporary or permanent, refer to a range of usually un-
measurable or unmeasured losses such as loss of social net-
work, ancestral land, and a feeling of stability and
continuity. (Gosling, 1979).
1:6:0 COMPENSATION STRATEGIES
The compensation is basically a mitigation policy to
prevent the displaced people from becoming worse off as a
result of forced relocation. Economically, this may be either
in terms of their material and financial assets, their on-
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going incomes, or their future economic prospects. These
economic aspects are easily measured. However, there are
important social effects which are less easily measured. I
some respects the social aspects are more important than the
economic aspects. In social and psychological terms, the
inhibiting ideology behind planning a mitigation strategy is
to make the displacees feel satisfied with their conditions
after resettlement. (Gosling, 1979).
Two types of mitigation strategies are commonly used to
formulate programs for compensating the displaced population.
They are cash compensation and compensation in kind.
Cash compensation consists of paying for the losses with
money. It does not involve rehabilitating the displacees. In
contrast, compensation in kind, which normally includes giving
land for land and/or planned resettlement, does involve the
compensating agency in the rehabilitation process. Payment in
cash is commmon in developed countries, in urban societies,
and also in small-scale projects, while payment in kind is
more common in the developing world, particularly in large-
scale development projects. (Gosling, 1979).
Payment in the form of replacement land and homes is
common in cases where the government assumes the full respon-
sibility for relocating evacuees, whereas payment in cash is
associated with resettlement policies which permit evacuees to
manage their own resettlement. The freedom of choice in
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selecting the new location site is greater in the cash compen-
sation policy than it is in the planned resettlement.
It is not possible to state which of the two policies
best suits various affected individuals. This depends on the
type of community being displaced. A policy which might be
appropriate for one society may be totally inappropriate for
another. Generally speaking, the land replacement policy is
accepted as a reasonable alternative where replacement land is
as good as or better than previously owned land. It is also
considered suitable in basically agricultural societies.
Finding the same quality of land, however, is not an easy
task. In many cases land compensation involves replacement of
flooded fertile river land with uplands of marginal
productivity.
Literally, compensation means to make up for something
lost. In the case of public works, such as dams, highways,
urban renewal and the like, it is usually the government which
compensates the individuals and private organizations for
their losses arising from the intended public action. The
underlying philosophy is pareto optimality, that is, to make
some individuals better off without making others worse off
due to the proposed action (Pokharel, 1985). This concept
requires a clear recognition on the part of the state of the
rights of the citizens to possess things which make them well
off. Another requirement is that the state's decision be
22
based on the ethics of protecting the well-being of its
citizens. As such it can basically function under the norms
which prohibit the state to take actions that make its
citizens worse off. All of this probably requires that the
society be organized democratically. It is only in a demo-
cratic context that compensation carries full meaning. In a
society where everything belongs to the state and where the
state does not recognize and protect individuals rights, dis-
cussion of the issue of compensation does not make any sense
(Pokhrel, 1985). The more autocratic the government, the more
likely it is that the compensation issue makes less sense.
Similarly, compensation also demands that there be only one
market. In countries where a dual market exists, everything
carries two prices: the official price and the actual market
price. The official price is always lower than the actual
market price. In such case the compensation price would not
reflect the losses which would be in real market prices.
No trauma could be more painful for a family than to get
uprooted from a place where it has lived for generations and
to move to a place where it may be a total stranger. And
nothing could be more irksome than being asked to switch over
to an avocation which the family has never practiced before.
The losses of the non-material kind such as life, pride,
cultural value, or psychological brunt can not be compensated
in monetary terms. The compensation strategies normally take
into account material losses and no attempt can ever be suc-
cessful to monetize the non-material losses.
23
CHAPTER II
RESETTLEMENT IN INDIA: EFFORTS AND LIMITATIONS
In this chapter the history of water resources and the
problems of displacement are presented in detail. The Land
Acquisition Act of 1894 is the only legal tool for resettle-
ment and attempt has been made here to depict the administra-
tive mechanism of the Act and the problems arising thereof.
Various state governments have made efforts to formulate
resettlement policy from time to time which is discussed in
the last part of the chapter.
2:1:0 DEVELO'PMENT OF WATER RESOURCES IN INDIA
Besides its traditional use for household consumption and
irrigation purposes, water has emerged as a major source of
energy in India. Hydroelectric power generation has acquired
the most prominent position in India today.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century the East India
Company found, in the kingdoms of Tanjore and Delhi, old
irrigation systems which were remarkably sophisticated but
badly in need of repairs. In the north it was the waters of
the Jamuna which had been diverted into canals which ran for
hundred of miles and reached as far south as Delhi. In the
south, an amazing ancient system of anicuts and weirs control-
24
led the movement of water through a very intricate system of
channels.2
The Ganges Canal which was opened in 1854 and which cost
three million pounds, was the first of India's giant irriga-
tion projects. It was funded by loans that had been raised in
London.
One of the most compelling arguments in favour of irriga-
tion was the protection it provided against monsoons. In the
latter half of the nineteenth century there was a. series of
major famines in different parts of India. Though the monsoon
never played truant throughout the subcontinent at any one
time and consequently the famines were always relatively
localized, before the advent of the railway and roadway net-
work it was difficult to assign the areas affected by drought
by rushing food grains and fodder on a large scale from other
areas. By 1960, irrigation played a very important part in
mitigating the impact of droughts and where it was available,
its utilization always increased markedly during periods of
natural calamity. However, the real and professed reason the
East India Company favoured the extension of irrigation was
not because it protected the public from famines, but because
revenue from irrigation invariably skyrocketed during famines
and also the presence of irrigation made wasteful expenditure
2. Anicut is a small earthern dam preventing water to flow
down. Weir is a stone dam.
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on relief and welfare measures unnecesssarv to the East India
Company. (Whitcombe, 1982).
In 1864, The British Government decided that the state
should undertake all the irrigation works it can manage. When
surplus revenues and available balances were insufficient to
meet the requirements, funds were raised by means of loans.
This was the beginning of the exposure of irrigation develop-
ment to the ups and downs of the money market benefit-cost
calculations. At the time there was no prospect of raising
loans in India and they were to be raised by the imperial
government in England. (Nag and Kathpalia, 1975). This was,
however, the precursor of the current situation: when inter-
national financial agencies are in a generous mood, dams
appear in great numbers.
The last quarter of the nineteenth century was marked by
massive famines which provided an impetus to the development
of transport facilities for relief, since irrigation had, as a
preventive measure against famines, proved limited. The
Famine Commission pointed out, in 1879, that the protective
and preventive power of irrigation was confined only to some
productive areas, and the localities in which large-scale
irrigation could be undertaken with significant advantage were
becoming exhausted. Secondly in the worsening financial
climate in the last years of the century productive irrigation
works had made a somewhat disappointing contribution.
(Whitcombe, 1982).
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The present century began with the Indian Irrigation
Commission initiated by British Government bringing to bear
the best professional opinion available on the problem of
delineating the limits and tasks of irrigation in India. It
was possible, in theory, to overcome these limitations imposed
by nature, provided sufficient capital could be raised to
build dams. It emphasized the role of wells and other alter-
natives to major works which still provided about 60 percent
of the irrigation at the beginning of the century.
Some features of irrigation development, which are quite
common now, made their first appearance in the second quarter
of the present century. These included inordinate delays.
For example, the Sukkur Barrage constructed after discussions
stretching over thirty years; - cost more than 78 million
rupees. Also, interstate disputes between riparian states,
for example, between Madras and Mysore over the Mettur Dam,
caused delays.
The scene changed completely after independence and par-
tition, when one third of the irrigated area went to Pakistan.
To meet the food demands of an increasing population with a
suddenly reduced irrigated area, the national government made
an all-out effort to develop irrigation. Between 1,000 and
1,500 projects were initiated after independence and the
acreage in irrigation more than doubled from 1950 to 1970.
(The State of India's Environment 1985).
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Though a hydroelectricity plant using a natural waterfall
near Darjeeling to generate 400 KWS, was in operation as early
as 1897 , the most significant hydroelectric projects were
built in Mysore and Bombay. Mysore's Cauvery Falls installa-
tions first opened in 1902 and was greatly enlarged step by
step until 1933. It was the first major project for both
urban and rural electrification. The government of pre-
independence India had declared to start an experimental 1,000
KW hydroelectric power stations in the Nilgiris to supply
power to a nearby ordinance factory. However, when the Tatas
constructed their first 48,000 KW hydroelectric power station
at Bhore Ghat in 1914 to cater to the growing urban and indus-
trial needs of Bombay City, the first real pre-independence
precursor of subsequent developments had made its appearance.
Up until independence, the history of water resource
development was the history of irrigation, but now there was a
change. The emphasis after independence was on super
ambitious multi-purpose river basin development projects.
There were two reasons for this. The first was that sites for
diversionary irrigation projects were just about exhausted.
The second, and more important reason, was the link between
large dams - which impounded huge bodies of water and which
could be used for flood control and generating power - and the
desire to promote industrial and urban development.
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3. Similar plants had sprung up near other Himalayan stations
in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
2:2:0 PROBLEM OF DISPLACEMENT
Large numbers of people have been displaced by irrigation
related development projects in India. Though the exact
number of such oustees is not known, at least one million
people have been displaced since 1950. The four steel plants
in Bhilai, Durgapur, Bokaro, and Rourkela displaced about
20,000 families. Coal mines belonging to four subsidiaries of
Coal India Ltd. displaced another 33,000 families. Con-
sidering that only eighteen projects in the states of Madhya
Pradesh, Orissa, Gujarat, and Maharashtra have together dis-
placed about 75,000 families, it is more than likely that the
total number of oustees even due to irrigation projects is
seriously underestimated. The following table gives the esti-
mated number of displaced persons by irrigation projects which
are either completed or planned.
Table 2
DISPLACEMENT BY IRRIGATION PROJECTS IN INDIA
Name of the Estimated Number
Project of Displaced
Bhakra 30,000
Ganga Valley 300,000
Nagarjun Sagar 25,000
Narmada Sagar 120,000
Pochampad 30,000
Polavaran 100,000
Pong 80,000
Srisailam 100,000
Tehri 70,000
Ukai 55,000
Source: Singh, Ramchandra, "Civilization in Hurry", 1980.
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Apart from thousands of irrigation projects, industries,
mines, defense, transportation, and communication projects
have all led to involuntary resettlement of population. Even
when forced relocation occurs en masse - e.g. due to the
construction of a reservoir or a missile testing range - the
exact number of "oustees" is often not known. During the
project preparation stage estimates tend to be low. Since
resettlement is a protracted process, there is usually a
natural increase in the population before the process can be
completed. (Scudder, 1973).
2:3:0 THE RESETTLEMENT PROCESS IN INDIA
The problem of resettlement arising from irrigation
development in India is by no means negligible. If given the
magnitude of the problem of displacement caused by various
kinds of development projects, the legal, administrative, and
policy mechanisms to facilitate rehabilitation are inadequate.
A fact-finding committee, appointed by the Lokayan Project of
the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, in
1981 to study the problems of displacement and rehabilitation
in the Srisailam Project in the State of Andhra Pradesh,
concluded that the Government had no rehabilitation program
worth its name (Lokayan Bulletin 4). Similarly, a study of
the rehabilitation efforts following the construction of Koyna
Dam in the State of Maharashtra (Karve, and Nimbkar, 1969),
concludes that while the Government of Maharashtra made an
honest attempt at rehabilitation, poor planning undermined its
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efficiency. In Gujarat too there is no clear policy of reset-
tlement. In the light of the recommendations of the Narmada
Tribunal Award, 1979, the Government of Gujarat recently
passed a resolution laying down guidelines for rehabilitation.
However, these resolutions deal primarily with compensation
for land and provision of minimum facilities at the relocation
site. They are, at best, a partial response to the problem.
2:4:0 LAND ACQUISITION ACT OF 1894
In order to understand better the inadequacy of the
policy response, it is necessary to examine the legal basis of
resettlement policies. The legal guidelines for acquiring
land and providing compensation are contained in the Land
Acquisition Act. This act, passed by the British in 1894,
provides for the acquisition of private land for public
purpose. (The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Government of
India).
The history of land acquisition legislation in India
dates back to the beginning of the last century. The first
relevant piece of legislation was the Bengal Regulation Act of
1824. It enabled the officers of Government to obtain land or
other "immovable property" required for roads, canals, or
other public purposes. Later, as a result of deterioration in
public health caused by the industrial revolution, land was
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taken for urban renewal, railway and road networks, and town
expansion.
The Land Acquisition Act of 1894, provided detailed rules
regarding the award of compensation. Amendments were made to
the 1894 Act from time to time. Despite these amendments,
the administrative procedure has basically remained the same
since 1894.
In the context of land acquisition, the term "Land" does
not refer merely to vacant land but includes structures and
trees which may be existing on it. Hence Section 3(a) of the
Land Acquisition Act, clearly defines "Land" as including
"benefits" to arise out of land, and "things attached to the
earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the
earth". (Section 3, The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Govern-
ment of India.)
2:4:1 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE UNDER LAND ACQUISITION ACT
An important administrative principle with regard to the
operation of the Land Acquistion Act is that whenever any
government department or a public authority wants to acquire
land, they must send their requisition proposal to the approp-
riate officer of the Government who will, on their behalf, go
through the various stages of the land acquisition procedure
until he takes possession of the land and hands it over to the
concerned department or authority. Hence, in every district
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and large city there is an Acquisition Officer. The following
are the major stages in the acquisition procedure. (The Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, Government of India.)
1. Publication of preliminary notification under Section
4(1) of the Act by the Government that a particular land is
needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose.
2. Hearing of objections to the above-mentioned notifi-
cation from interested parties by the Collector and his
report to the Government in the matter.
3. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act by the
Government that the land is required for a public purpose.
4. Notification under Section 9 of the Act by the
Collector declaring the Government's intention to acquire land
and calling for claims for compensation from interested
parties.
5. Inquiry into the compensation claims and passing of
awards by the Collector.
6. Taking possession of the land by the Collector after
payment of compensation and handing it over to the authority
requiring the same.
4. A state government officer dealing with revenue and land
acquisition.
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2:4:2 DETERMINATION OF COMPENSATION
The basic principle accepted by the Act for the award of
compensation is the market value of the land at the date of
preliminary notification under Section 4, subject to certain
5
additions for various damages plus 15 percent solatium on the
market value in view of the compulsory nature of acquisition.
As per Section 23 (Section II, The Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Government of India) the factors to be considered in
determining compensation are:
1. The market value of the land on the date of Section
4(1) notification.
2.
the land.
Damage sustained due to standing crops or trees on
3. Damage sustained due to severing the acquired land
from the remaining land of the owner.
4. Injurious effects on other property "movable or
immovable" in any other manner or his earnings.
5. Expenses of shift of residence or business due to the
acquisition.
5. Damages awarded to a plaintiff to compensate him for
personal suffering or grief arising from an injury.
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6. Damage for diminution of the profits from the land
between the date of Section 6 Declaration and the taking
possession of the land by the Collector.
7, Fifteen percent solatium is added to the market value
in view of the compulsory nature of acquisition.
No attempt has been made in the Act to define exactly the
term "market value". The normal sense of the term is that it
represents the price which a willing purchaser is ready to pay
to a willing seller. This determination has been left
primarily to the Collector and ultimately to the court. Since
in any acquisition of land the owner does not have any choice
in parting with his land, as compared to a free market trans-
action, he has been compensated by being given an additional
15 percent solatium on the market value of land. In deciding
the market value of the land, the Collector normally checks
the recent transactions for lands in adjacent areas. The
potential value of the land must also be taken into considera-
tion. The market value of a plot has to be determined with
reference to certain characteristics such as its location,
size, shape, road frontage, etc. Where a plot abutting a road
is very deep, land is divided into belts of different values
for purposes of compensation. The first belt of land for the
road side is kept at a higher value than the belt coming
beyond it. 6
6. The valuation procedure is laid down by the Department of
Land Valuation, Government of Gujarat.
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Sales transactions of land to be checked must (1) be
recent or not more than six years old and bona fide (2) relate
to adjacent lands (not more than one mile away). The Collec-
tor must also check capitalization of rent and potential
value. Usually three belts are taken for depths of 60 feet,
150 feet and the rest, the value of second and third belts
being 66 percent and 50 percent of that of the first belt.7
It is evident from Section 23 of the Act that the scope
of compensation is wider than the market value of the land and
includes reasonable damages and expenses payable to the owner.
A relevant factor that should be mentioned here is that the
Collector himself is not a person trained in valuation, though
he often obtains expert advice.
2:4:3 PROBLEMS OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT
The Act was passed by the then British Government in
1894. The same is made enforceable even today. Under this
act, the government can acquire any privately owned land for
'public purpose'. The government pays compensation in cash
against the land it thus acquires. The Act is not specially
meant for acquiring land for irrigation only. It is
applicable for all types of 'public purpose' all over the
country. It does not treat tribals (See Appendix I for
definition of tribals) as a special category.
7. Ibid.
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Land is considered to be private property of the owner.
Hence, for the purpose of land acquisition and compensation,
it is the individual legal owner of the land who is taken into
account. While acquiring land, the government has to deal
with the single land owner rather than a family, group, com-
munity, or a village as a whole. This makes a difference
because, while acquiring land for development purposes, land
acquisition affects the entire social hierarchy and order and
not just the owner of the land. This subtle aspect is missing
in the Land Acquisition Act.
Moreover, the total land of any one village is not be be
acquired at a single stroke. Whenever there is a massive work
that has several phases, land is being acquired as it is
required for the particular phase of the work. In this way
when land is being acquired at different points of time, it
gives differential treatment to the oustees in terms of com-
pensation. As far as the Narmada Project is concerned, this
sort of phase-wise acquisition has created problems. One,
whose land was acquired earlier got less amount by way of
compensation, while his neighbor, whose land was of the same
quality, but was acquired later, got relatively more money.
The Act provides for cash compensation. It is assumed
that with the compensation in the form of cash, the tribal
oustees would purchase land elsewhere and get themselves
resettled. It was always found later that the amount of
compensation that was paid in cash was squandered away. The
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assumption that the tribal oustees can buy land from the open
market on their own and get themselves resettled has generally
been proved to be incorrect. It is observed from the Ukai Dam
experience, that left to themselves, the tribal oustees could
not solve their problems.
The Act does not provide any compensation for the loss of
employment to the landless labourers, forest produce
collectors, forest land cultivators, etc. People engaged in
non-agricultural activities like fishing are also not entitled
to compensation. For example, there are 750 families along a
150 KM river stretch downstream of Broach town who make a
living out of catching hilsa fish. The construction of Sardar
Sarovar Narmada Dam will interfere with hilsa migration and
750 families will be rendered unemployed.
Even when compensation is paid to villagers through their
bank accounts, it has been found that part of it goes in
sustaining them during the shift to a new site and much of the
rest is frittered away in non-productive expenditure. Another
problem is that the government takes only land which is to be
submerged or is required for other purposes, leaving many
partly affected people in the lurch. When part of a village
is shifted elsewhere, the families left behind face a life of
isolation. In some cases, when the major portion of a
family's land is taken over, it can neither survive on the
remaining area nor get any compensation for the remaining land
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or house, if it decides to shift along with fellow villagers.
So there is no provision in the Land Acquisition Act for
families who are isolated in partly affected villages. Almost
all the families left in the vicinity of Shirsagar Koyna Dam
in the State of Maharashtra live in scattered bastis below the
poverty line, as they have no means of subsistence except for
a few quintals of paddy grown by primitive methods. (The
State of India's Environment, 1985).
Several problems arise from the way in which prices are
fixed for acquired land. In pratically every case the oustees
are the ones who have to suffer as a result. In the Bhakra
Dam reservoir, land acquired from the oustees was evaluated on
the basis of the average price of land during 1942-47, whereas
the land allotted to them in Harayana was on the basis of
average price during 1951-57. Since there was a steep rise in
land prices after 1947, due to the influx of refugees after
partition of the subcontinent, this disparity led to the
oustees getting much less for their land than they had to pay
for the land allotted to them. (Dogra, 1982).
In Srisailam the estimated value of land acquired from
the oustees was Rs. 4,987 per acre of dry land and Rs. 13,682
per acre of wet land. The average compensation paid per acre
however was Rs. 932 and Rs. 2,332 respectively. Similarly in
the Bedti Project area the compensation paid was a fraction of
the actual costs of the acquired land. (Narendranath and
Chaudhary, 1982).
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Since the market rate of land is decided on the basis of
registration fees paid on land transactions and since there is
a widespread tendency to evade stamp duty by quoting lower
price on sale deeds than are actually paid in practice, it
leads to the underestimation of oustees' land.
A criticism has often been levied that the land acquisi-
tion proceedings take considerable time to fructify and this
criticism is justified to a considerable extent. There is no
time limit between Section 4 (1) and Section 6 that is general
notification and actual land acquisition declaration. But the
compensation is based on the market value prevailing on the
date of Section 4 notification. The three year limit between
Section 4 and Section 6 notifications tends to encourage
delays. There are additional delays due to injunctions and
stay orders. Evidently there is need for a time limit for
completion of land acquisition proceedings.
Another aspect of the Land Acquisition Act is that it is
too executive-ridden in which the Government and the Land
Acquisition Collector enjoy vast discretionary powers. For
instance, the purpose for which the land is to be acquired as
well as the question as to which land is to be acquired are
within the subjective satisfaction of the Government and this
is finally decided by an officer in the secretariat who has
not conducted the inquiry and the scope for judicial review is
extremely limited. The Act makes no provision for any ag-
grieved party to make a reference to the Court at any stage of
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the land acquisition proceedings except to require, af-ter the
award has been passed, that the same may be referred to the
court of judicial review. The courts have emphasised from
time to time that the proceedings must be strictly complied
with and any deviation from the procedure may result in the
a!;4ing of the proceedings. (Rao, 1979).
The Mulla Committee on Land Acquisition (1981) has
recently submitted its report to the Government of India
suggesting some changes in the Land Acquisition Law and it is
hoped the government would make appropriate decisions in this
regard soon. The committee has recommended the following
major changes.
1. Setting up of a high level committee in every state
for implementing the Committees recommendation and ensuring
that excessive land is not acquired.
2. A time limit of three years for the entire
proceedings.
3. Increase of solatium from 15 percent to 30 percent.
4. It should be possible for the owner to resume land
use if it is not utilized for the purpose for which it has
been acquired.
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Thus the Land Acquisition Act raises several questions.
According to the constitution of independent India, ours is a
welfare state wedded to the uplift of the weaker section of
society. The state considers the tribals as a special
category of people for the purpose of offering them state help
for their uplift. Under such a situation if a state action
(land acquisition) deprives some tribals of their land, house,
employment, etc., it is the duty of the state to see that they
are properly resettled.
This is not an isolated case of land acquisition where
the compensation would suffice. The oustees are deprived of
their employment, environment, and habitat. Their economic
loss may or may not be compensated for by the amount of
compensation but what about the social and psychological
stress and strains which they are subjected to? What about
their right of habitat that they have been enjoying since
generations past and which the constitution also safeguards?
These lead to the conclusion that the Land Acquisition Act is
not in line with the constitutional provisions and the state
policy, for tribal development.
2:5:0 NATIONAL EFFORTS TOWARDS RESETTLEMENT POLICY
The awareness that resettlement policy over and above the
ninety-two year old Acquisition Act is needed to cope with
development related displacement has been growing in India
only during the last few years. Until now, it has been as-
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sumed that providing compensation to land holders under the
Land Acquisition Act would be sufficient to enable them to
resettle themselves.
In 1980, the Secretary (Irrigation) of the Government of
India wrote a letter to all state governments saying, "There
has, in recent times, been an awakening on the part of people
whose land and property get submerged as a result of execution
of major irrigation, power, and multi-purpose reservoir
projects... Unless satisfactory measures are kept protecting
the interests of the oustees particularly the weaker ones, the
Government of India might not entertain acceptance of the
project since resettlement issues might hold up the progress
of the projects and result in excessive cost escalation."
In 1982, the Government of India called a conference of
Chief Ministers, to formulate recommendations to the states
regarding resettlement of displaced tribals. These guidelines
record the conspicuous results of public works on tribals who
are displaced by such projects, and recommend that the state
and central governments "evolve policies and strategies aimed
at dispensing a fresh equitable economic and social order
while displacing tribal families for development projects...".
During the 1960's the Ministry of Home Affairs suggested
to all departments of the Government of India that concessions
should be granted in employment, especially at the lower
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level, to persons losing land for public or defense projects.
More recently, the National Thermal Power Corporation laid
down a policy on facilities to be provided to land oustees,
and the departments of mines, coal, and steel have taken some
action regarding resettlement, pending common guidelines. The
World Bank which now finances more and more dams also issued,
in 1982, a set of policy guidelines for projects financed by
it which affect tribal people. (Economic Development and
Tribal Projects: Humas Ecological Considerations, World Bank,
1981).
2:6:0 RESETTLEMENT POLICIES OF STATE GOVERNMENTS
Several state governments have evolved their own policies
regarding resettlement. The government of Maharashtra passed
the Resettlement of Project-Displaced Persons Act in 1982.
Other state governments, including Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh,
Orissa, Rajasthan, Tripura, and Karnataka also passed resolu-
tions laying down policy guidelines for resettlement. (Varma,
1984).
The Maharashtra Act of 1982 empowers the government to
set up special administrative machinery to resettle displaced
persons. Resettlement is to be achieved by conferring the
power to acquire land for this purpose on the proper
authority. The law provides for the collection of information
about the land from which people are displaced and the land
available for resettlement. It also provides for restrictions
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to be placed on transfer, sub-division, or partition of land
in the zone which benefits from a project. It provides for
the resettlement of displaced persons on land acquired for the
purpose from the zone which benefits from a given project.
This is likely to reduce the inequalities which result from
many such projects.
The Act also stipulates that among the list of lands to
be drawn up by the Resettlement Officer which can be made
available for resettling displaced persons, he may also in-
clude government forest lands which may be used for cultiva-
tion after deforestation. This may exacerbate deforestation
caused by resettlement.
Another important feature of the Maharashtra Act is that
it provides for a modicum of land to be provided even to
displaced landless agricultural labourers, provided they leave
with the agriculturists who are resettled on the land provided
by the government.
The resettlement policies of other states also offer
several features besides the recognition that in the case of
public works entailing displacement, it will not suffice to
merely compensate legal owners for property acquired. The
policies adopted by the state governments of Orissa, Gujarat,
Maharashtra and Rajasthan are based on precise definitions of
an oustee and a family. These definitions also cover those
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who are displaced by development projects without being owners
of property. Other state governments rely on the framework
provided by the awards of tribunals set up to resolve disputes
between riparian states, for example Madhya Pradesh, or do not
define oustees or families precisely.
The rehabilitation of some state governments have evolved
in the context of specific projects - for example the Narmada
Project in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh, or the Mahi Bajaj Sagar
Dam in Rajasthan - whereas those of other states like Tripura
are shaped entirely by central government recommendations.
A comparison of the policies adopted by various state
governments shows, however, several differences pertaining to
rates of compensation, the provision of alternative agricul-
tural land - if it is to be made available to oustee agricul-
turists in the first place - and the provision of alternative
housing sites, basic amenities, grants, subsidies, and credit,
health, and educational assistance.
Some state governments follow resettlement policies
wherein the aims of resettlement and administrative and
regulative machinary for implementation of programs are more
clearly stated than in the case of others. While the
Maharashtra Act provides a model policy in some respects, the
policies of states like Gujarat and Orissa also provide for
communal relocation in a site of choice and maintenance or
improvement in the standard of living of the oustees, and
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special protection to tribals or other underprivileged oustee
groups. Other states have yet to evolve resettlement policies
which are in consonance with the recommendations of the
central government, especially for the rehabilitation of
tribals. Though the policies of some states visualize the
resettlement of oustees on forest land, this is no longer
permissible due to the decision of the Department of Environ-
ment of the central government to prohibit resettlement of
oustees on forest land, in view of the critical depletion of
forest cover.
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CHAPTER III
THE UKAI PROJECT
In this chapter the case study of Ukai Dam is presented
to understand the resettlement process undertaken by the state
government of Gujarat. The resettlement was guided by several
government resolutions and these are discussed along with
their implications. The socio-economic and ecological impact
of the Ukai Dam are presented in the last part of the chapter.
3:1:0 THE UKAI DAM
The Ukai Dam is situated on the river Tapi which
originates in Central India and flows westward, meeting the
Arabian Sea. The river Tapi was the source of devastating
floods along the entire route it travelled. Several settle-
ments, including the city of Surat had ravaging experiences
throughout the history. The earliest exploration of flood
protection measures was carried out at the end of the
nineteenth century by the British Government (Whitcombe,
1982). However, a multiphased effort to coordinate irriga-
tion, flood control, and hydroelectricity along the Tapi was
not initated until the 1950's.
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FIGURE 2 LOCATION OF UKAI DAM PROJECT
The project, the Ukai Dam, envisaged a 621 metre long
and 14 metre high weir at Kakarapar. The first phase of the
project was completed in 1953. The second phase, completed in
1972, involved a 4,928 metre long and 68.6 metre high dam
across the Tapi near Ukai, The dam was designed to generate
300 mw of electricity and to protect the lower Tapi basin -
especially Surat City - from devastating floods. The dam was
also designed to create 386,000 hectares of new irrigated
land. Of an estimated total cost for phase II of 1,146
million rupees, 932.3 million rupees were earmarked for
irrigation.
3:2:0 THE PROJECT IMPACT
The total land acquired for the project was spread over
two districts in Gujarat - Surat and Bharuch - and one in
Maharashtra, - Dhulia. A total of 170 villages were affected.
A full reservoir level of 105.16 metres or 345 feet was
measured in calculating the amount of land that would be
submerged. The area of land acquired totalled 60,802
hectares.
Of the 170 villages in the reservoir area, 100 were fully
submerged while the remaining were partially submerged. A
total of 16,080 families were displaced by the project. Of
8. The land between the full reservoir level and a high flood
level of 106.98 meters was not acquired, but the dwellings
located on this area were shifted elsewhere.
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these, 14,148 families were resettled in seventeen settle-
ments. The remaining 1,932 families moved away on their own
after accepting ad hoc grants averaging 550 Rupees. Thus, 138
villages were resettled in the seventeen groups of resettle-
ment. (Report of the Department of Irrigation, Government of
Gujarat, 1972).
Land acquired for the project was only a part of the
total land affected by the project. As already mentioned
above, 60,802 hectares were acquired. However, the total area
affected even at full reservoir level (not high flood level)
was as follows:
Occupied agricultural land 30,352 hectares
Government waste land 11,568 hectares
Government forest land 22,258 hectares
Total 64,178 hectares
Over and above this, 7,378 hectares of forests were
cleared by the Government of Gujarat and actually distributed
for agricultural purposes.
3:3:0 ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION FOR RESETTLEMENT
For the purpose of acquiring land and facilitating reset-
tlement of the displaced population a special organization
headed by an Additional Collector9 and supported by revenue
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9. A state government officer dealing with revenue and land
acquisition.
staff10 was created by the State Government of Gujarat.
According to a resolution of the government dated November 29,
1968 an advisory committee for resettlement was also formed
under the chairmanship of the Additional Collector. The com-
mittee included Resettlement Officers, the Conservator of
Forests, District Development Officers, the Ukai Executive
Engineer, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the Super-
intending Agricultural Officer, presidents of District
Panchayats, and prominent local leaders and representatives of
voluntary social organizations (Department of Irrigation,
Government of Gujarat, 1968). This committee met from time to
time to advise the government about resettlement.
3:4:0 RESETTLEMENT POLICY
The land was acquired, compensation was paid, and ar-
rangements were made for resettlement under eleven government
regulations:
1. Resolution - October 4, 1967
This resolution provided the conditions under which
cleared forest land could be sold to agriculturists, whose
lands were acquired for the project.
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10. A government department mainly collecting taxes and food
grain levy from farmers.
Area of land Area of land made available
acquired in new settlement
Up to 3 acres actual area acquired
3 to 9 acres 3 acres
9 to 12 acres 1/3rd of actual area acquired
More than 12 acres 4 acres
This area of land made available for agricultural pur-
poses after clearing forests was to be sold at some appro-
priate price determined by the government. The compensation
paid included a 15 percent solatium, and ranged between Rs.
600 to Rs. 960 per acre for different catagories of land. For
waste land the compensation paid was only Rs. 40 per acre.
The compensation offered was first of all quite
inadequate, considering the quality of land acquired. The
acquired land was mostly fertile, enriched as it was by the
silt deposited on the riverbanks. It was also well drained
and capable of yielding multiple crops even without irrigation
or fertilizers. Against this, the land offered in return was
first of all too little to be economical (see Government
Resolution 1, 1967). Moreover, it was the land whose forest
cover was removed overnight as it were, and hence instead of
being constantly enriched it was vulnerable to continuous
impoverishment. It was not, therefore, an adequate substitute
for the land that was acquired. (Mistry and Purohit, 1982).
When the villages were resettled, each landholder was
given a maximum of four acres of land in areas cleared of
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forests. Earlier, in old settlements, many persons had been
cultivating land that was not in their name, or in several
cases, large joint-family holdings were in the name of the
head of the household only. In these cases only one title-
holder got a plot of land. The cultivators were promised help
in building wells, land improvement, use of forest resource,
removal of tree stumps and leaves, and electricity. However,
none of these promised measures were actually carried out.
(Mankodi and Gangopathyay, 1983).
Many people in the obey area11 complained that they were
suffering from forced idleness (Choudhari and Choksi, 1969).
Since they could only grow one crop during a year, agricul-
tural operations which kept most of them busy all the year
round in their former villages could only keep them busy for a
short period in the resettled village.
One result of this has been an increase in the incidence
of social problems like drunkenness and gambling. It has been
observed that due to forced idleness more people tended to
indulge in drinking. In one village (Tokarwa) it was found
that some outsiders who had settled in the resettled village
were operating a matka (number gambling) ring which systemati-
11. Obey area - Upstream area not benefitted by construction
of dam.
Command area - Area under control for irrigation purposes.
Area benefitted by construction of dam.
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cally soaked up a fair part of the cash available from the new
economic activites, like marketing milk or fish. (Mankodi and
Gangopathyay, 1983).
2. Resolution - October 7, 1967
Since the extent of area submerged was not determined at
the time and since the spread of the reservoir would vary from
time to time depending upon the rainfall in the catchment
areas and the water released from the dam for utilization,
these resolutions determined the condition under which the
reservoir banks could be cultivated.
Until such time as the acquired land was submerged, the
former owners were allowed to cultivate it on an annual basis
after paying double revenue and various other taxes. Agricul-
turists whose lands were under submergence were to be given
preference for bed/bank cultivation. The maximum area thus
made available was three acres with a limit of a total of
sixteen acres which the agriculturists could cultivate in all,
inclusive of all their other lands. Bed cultivation was to be
allowed normally on an annual basis with the possibility of
triennial leases where the lands remained unsubmerged for long
periods. The land revenue collected from such plots was
twelve times the normal rate and no compensation or revenue
exemption could be claimed in the event of any damage to crops
in such plots due to floods. If the acquired land remained
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unsubmerged for longer periods they could be returned to the
former owners if compensation paid by the government is
refunded.
The scheme under this resolution did not succeed because
of the distance between the new settlement and the river bed
of the old village. People could not efficiently manage
cultivation at two locations. Moreover, people were reluctant
to accept the proposal due to the continuous threat of flood,
no compensation in case of damage to the crops, and double
revenue charged by the government..
3. Resolution - November 28, 1967
Landholders could avail themselves of loans at six
percent interest through the Ukai Navnirman Sangh, a voluntary
social organization, for the purpose of additional acres with
a maximum of eight extra acres.
Most of the farmers were unable to use the loan
facilities because of escalation in land values in new
location and limited loan amount. Moreover, the quality of
land was poor and farmers did not feel confident to invest
money where return was uncertain.
4. Resolution - July 1, 1963; March 6, 1968; October 7, 1967;
February 3, 1968; and October 7, 1967.
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These resolutions laid down the conditions for the erec-
tion of alternative dwellings for the displaced. Oustee land-
owners were to be given residential plots of eighty feet by
forty feet and those who did not own land were to be given
plots of forty feet square. Transportation for material
belongings, including construction materials was to be pro-
vided free of cost to the oustees by the governemnt, provided
the value of the construction material to be transported was
less than Rs. 5,000/- and the shifting was done within the
stipulated period. Loans for building new houses were
available at 7 percent interest up to a maximum of Rs. 4,000/-
and in exceptional cases Rs 5,000/-, provided they conformed
to certain standards. Extra plots could be purchased by the
oustees for the use of family members under certain condi-
tions.
A well was to be constructed in the new settlements for
every hundred persons to be resettled, with water facilities
for cattle.
Wells were not dug because the official policy was of
providing help for digging a new well only against every well
submerged in the reservoir. Since all the submerged villages
had direct access to the river earlier, wells had not been
necessary in the old location of the villages. Hence no new
wells were dug for the resettled cultivators.
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Free transportation of construction material was subject
to a maximum of Rs. 5000 and thus the new houses built were of
a very inferior quality. The free transportation had a condi-
tion attached to it, namely that it was to be available only
if the oustees were to follow the government's timetable for
the shifting. This created problem because the new villages
were not ready with all the promised amenities and the govern-
ment was in a hurry to acquire the reservoir site. Moreover
no electricity was provided for domestic use or for illu-
minating public places. By and large the facilities provided
in the resettlement villages were inadequate. Only in one
village did the availability of drinking water improve after
resettlement. Some of the roads provided in the settlement
colonies are completely unusable due to poor construction and
maintenance. (Mankodi and Gangopadhyay, 1983).
In sharp contrast to the dry dusty and bleak look of the
resettlement colonies, are the lush gardens and lawns and the
well lit and more than comfortable dwellings provided at the
dam site where those who plan, build, maintain, and benefit
from the project stay.
5. Resolution - March 2, 1967.
In every resettled village about one half acre of land
was to be reserved for cattle.
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Tribal families usually have at least three to four
cattle per household. Even if we assume only one hundred
families in a village (actually 138 villages were resettled in
seventeen new settlements), it amounts to four hundred cattle
and a half acre of land is not sufficient for that purpose.
The resolution did not provide for the grazing land in the
resettled villages posing a major problem for the cattle.
6. Resolution - October 25, 1967.
In every resettlement village some land was to be
reserved for public purposes like crematoria, manure pits,
playgrounds, village local government, and kindergarten
buildings.
7. Resolution - January 17, 1966.
Approach roads and connecting roads with the necessary
culverts and other pertinent works were to be provided to the
resettlement villages.
8. Resolution - October 7, 1965.
Schools and public buildings existing in the affected
villages prior to 1964 would be replaced in the resettlement
villages. In those villages where such facilities did not
occur, demands for such public buildings were to be considered
on a priority basis.
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The schemes under resolutions 6, 7, and 8 were ideal but
very little materialized due to lack of strong local govern-
ment and consensus among people. Most of the promised con-
struction did not take place and the land earmarked for the
public purpose was eventually squatted illegally.
9. Resolution - January 5, 1967.
This resolution granted exemption from stamp duty 12to
the oustee families that could be levied on agreements signed.
This was a good gesture on the part of the government and it
helped smooth the legal procedures for land transaction.
10. Resolution - October 21, 1967.
For those who were willing to undergo training in certain
crafts, training classes in carpentry, masonery, turning,
tailoring, blacksmithing, and fitting were started in Ukai. A
monthly scholarship of Rs. 30 and free accommodation were also
offered.
In order to do something about the large-scale unemploy-
ment that resulted from the shrinking of the land base on
which the ousted communities survived, the government offered
two schemes. One was to give a certificate to any resettled
person who asked for it to the effect that he or she had been
12. Stamp duty is a government fee on any land transaction.
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affected by the Ukai Dam. The other involved training classes
in some crafts started at Ukai, where the trainees were to be
paid a stipend of Rs. 30 a month.
The stipend amount of Rs.30 was very little and hence it
did not attract tribals to undergo training. Their major
concern was of immediate survival at the time of displacement
and they looked for direct earning to stablilize themselves.
Their traditional occupation was forest based and cultivation
and it was difficult to switch to a totally different skill at
later age. Moreover, there was no placement service along
with training and future uncertainty of finding a job was
another discouraging factor.
Village leaders claim that in their former location vil-
lagers could hardly meet their own labour requirements. After
being displaced, however, there had been a massive increase in
the number of the unemployed. In the resettled village of
Narayanpur about 2,000 out of the total population of 6,000
stay away from the village for up to eight months. (Mankodi
and Gangopodhyay, 1983).
In some of the other resettled villages, including
Ksataskuwa, Khupi, Arkati, Kuida, Adgam, Kuchal, Panibara,
Mohini/Chardipur, between one third and three-fourths of the
huts were closed and sometimes sealed. These belonged to those
who had been forced to migrate in search of work to other
parts of the state. In the village of Dhupi, the primary
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school teacher explained that out of twenty-five children in
the primary school, only about ten were present in the
village. All the others accompanied their parents who had
migrated in search of work. (Mankodi and Grangopadhyay,
1983).
A study conducted by the Centre for Social Studies, (CSS)
Surat, India, ("Rural Migration in Command Area, Ukai Dam,
1980)" states that:
"During our stay in the obey area resettled villages,
about one and a half to two dozen trucks loaded to
capacity with labourers passed daily down the Nizar-
Ucchal Road. Large wayside camps of migrant labourers
were also visible between Bardoli and Ucchal. There were
caravans of close to 100 balluck carts and trains loaded
both inside and on top of the roof with migrant labourers
from the state of Maharashtra. In Ucchal a fleet of
twenty-eight chartered private busses was waiting to
transport workers to work in the sugarcane fields and
factories in the command area. Tractor trailers were
also used frequently for transporting workers. We were
told that at the beginning of the monsoon these labourers
return to the village with what remains of the few
hundred rupees of their wages and bonus after spending
heavily on alchohol to eke out the four months of the
monsoon in their inhospitable resettled villages."
11. Resolution - December 13, 1968.
Those oustees who would prefer to arrange for their own
resettlement were offered the following cash grants:
For every landless family
Landholding families not eligible
to get land in resettlement villages
Rs.- 450
Rs.- 550
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Landholding families eligible to get
land in resettlement villages Rs.- 670
These grants could be paid after the oustees relinquished
possession of their earlier dwellings, and such families were
not eligible to receive any other resettlement benefits.
There were several families who for some reason did not
wish to accept the government's help and generosity in reset-
tling them. Such families who were uprooted from their tradi-
tional habitats, who had to leave behind the security of their
land, houses, social relationships, and customary occupations
and face the uncertainties of life in a strange land among
strangers, were offered a petty sum of Rs. 450 to Rs. 670.
3:5:0 SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RESETTLEMENT
To understand the socio-economic impact of resettlement,
we have to consider the nature of the terrain inhabited by the
affected population, and examine the character of the economic
activities practiced by them both before and after resettle-
ment. The submerged villages were located on the Tapti Basin
on fertile land drained by tributaries of the Tapti River like
Nesu, Rangwali and Raigan and various smaller streams. The
Tapti flows westward through low undulations of the Satpura
mountain range which were thickly forested prior to submer-
gence, when nearly half the area (49 percent) was covered by
both moist and dry deciduous forests. The entire area had
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black alluvial soil which was gravelly in parts. Since it
received around fifty-five inches of rain annually and was
well drained, the soil was fertile and took to double cropping
without extra irrigation.
After the bifurcation of the Bombay State in 1960, a
major part of the submerging region formed part of the Dhule
District of the State of Maharashtra. Since Maharashtra did
not want to bear the burden of resettlement of the submerging
villages, two new talukas of Ucchal and Nizar were carved out
from the Dhule district and added to the Surat District of the
State of Gujarat. Ucchal, which besides being the most back-
ward taluka of Surat, was also the worst affected by submer-
gence. The two other talukas to be affected by submergence
were Songadh in the Surat District and Sagbara in the Bharuch
District, as follows:
Table 3
SUBMERGING VILLAGES - UKAI PROJECT
Taluka No. of totally No. of partially
submerged villages submerged villages
Songadh 14
Ucchal 34 15
Nizar 27 34
Sagbara 25 21
Total 100 70
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3:5:1 LAND UTILIZATION IN SUBMERGED VILLAGES
13
Since the submerging talukas were predominantly
inhabited by tribals 14, agriculture was the mainstay of the
economy and the dependence of- the tribals on land was nearly
total.
In Nizar taluka 91 percent of the land was cultivated
prior to the construction of the dam, which shrunk to 51
percent subsequently. Instead of 7 percent of the land which
was put to non-agricultural use prior to submergence, 41
percent was used for non-agricultural purposes subsequently.
Even in Songadh which was relatively less affected by sub-
mergence, agricultural land declined from 61 percent to 31
percent after submergence and land put to non-agricultural use
rose from a mere 3 percent to 26 percent.
Ucchal taluka retained only 13 percent of cultivable land
instead of 75 percent prior to resettlement. Whereas only 7
percent of the land in Ucchal was put to non-agricultural use
prior to submergence, after the construction of the Ukai dam,
60 percent of the land was utilized for non-agricultural
purposes. These figures show a drastic change in the land
utilization pattern. The primary means of production in an
13. Taluka is a subdistrict. Approximately 50 villages make
one Taluka.
14. For the definition of Tribals, see Appendix I.
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agrarian economy, namely land, was nearly halved on an average
when about 44 percent of the agricultural land was submerged.
The figures of occupational classification from the 1961
census show that on an average 95 percent of the workforce of
the submerging talukas was dependent on land. Of the 10,000
families affected by the construction of the dam, 8,776 were
agriculturists whereas the remaining 2,224 families were not
land holders., but yet dependent on land. (Census of Gujarat,
1971).
Table 4
OCCUPATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Taluka Agriculturist Agricultural Other
labourers occupations
Sangadh 73.0 22.6 4.4
Ucchal 58.3 35.0 6.7
Nizar 45.0 52.0 3.0
Sagbara 78.0 19.2 2.8
Average
submerging 64.3 30.7 5.0
talukas
For Surat
District as 49.0 35.7 15.3
a whole
Source: Census of Gujarat, 1971.
The figures of landholding pattern show that, before
resettlement, 40 percent of the landholders held more than
five acres of land and more than 46 percent held over ten
acres in the submerging talukas. After resettlement, nobody
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could hold more than four acres, and that too was of relative-
ly inferior land.
Table 5
LANDHOLDING PATTERN BY SIZE-CLASS IN PERCENTAGES
Small Medium Big Large
farmers farmers farmers farmers
0.5 to 5 to 9.9 10 to 15 +
Taluka 5 acres acres 14.9 acres acres
Songadh 31.2 :31.2 17.2 20.4
Ucchal 20.7 27.6 38.0 13.7
Nizar 19.0 32.5 15.5 33.0
Sagbara 18.2 34.2 18.7 28.2
Average in
4 talukas 22.5 31.4 22.5 23.6
Surat
District 54.7 21.3 10.0 14.0
Source: Census of Gujarat, 1971.
The result of this reduction in the availability of land
for agriculture is reflected in the production of both food
and non-food crops. Whereas families in the submerged vil-
lages could grow their entire requirement of food earlier, and
also generate a surplus to trade for their other requirements,
this was no longer possible after resettlement. Plentiful
availability of land, concentrated in fairly large land
holdings, had earlier assured even those who did not own any
land of their own of sufficient employment opportunities in
their own village. This group of landless labourers was
undoubtedly the hardest hit. However, all agriculturists
became uniformally marginalized due to the changed circum-
stances. Only a very small handful had the enterprise to
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Table 6
CROPPING PATTERN - UCCHAL TALUKA
(Area in hectares)
Y E A R
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Items Pre-rehabilitation Post-rehabilitation
Food Crops
A.
1.
2.
3.
Cereals
Rice
Wheat
Jowar
4. Bajri
5. Maize
6. Others
Total
6,913
176
9,344
128
5,993 2,057
101 4,047
8,781 3,796
100 36
6,301 5,721 2,046
22,862 20,696 1,982
1,639
28
2,(647
1,709
67
2,165
1,875
291
1,587
24 11 24
1,639 1,037 986
5,977 4,989 4,714
B. Pulses
Gram
Tur
Others
Total
2,
2,
278
488
689
2,
2,
233
547
733
1,
1,
104
089
308
5,455 5,513 2,501
36
771
972
101
859
592
221
1,040
505
1,779 1,352 1,766
Other Food Crops
Sugarcane
Fruits
Vegetables
Other Misc.
Total
07
89
59
155
15
87
61
163
04
37
26
67
08
21
17
-
02
299
17 08 256
- 2 5
46 25 557
Non-Food Crops
1. Cotton
Groundnut
Other oil
seeds
6,780 5,541
692 1,238
303 273
9,857
594
109 23 22 288
4. Tobacco
5.
6.
Fodder
Others
Total
Total Food &
Non-food Crop
7,775 7,052 10,560
36,247 33,424 32,369
1,163 1,019 1,162
8 _, 5 7, 5 4 ;
Source: Report of the Department of
of Gujarat, 1971.
Agriculture, Government
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1.
2.
3.
C.
1.
2.
3.
4.
2.
3.
803
337
603
394
703
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adapt to the new circumstances. Table 6 clearly shows the
cropping pattern changed drastically in Ucchal taluka from the
pre-resettlement to the post-resettlement period.
3:5:2 DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS IN RESETTLED VILLAGES
The Block Level Planning study of Jain (1980) observes
that the construction of the Ukai Dam has already dealt a
heavy blow to efforts directed at improvement of capital
structure. The resettlement money was only sufficient to meet
basic survival needs and could not be invested in enterprises
which could yield a continuing source of income, even by
landholders who were eligible for receiving compensation. The
compensation received by landholders was invested in the
following manner:
Table 7
INVESTMENT CHARACTERISTICS - UCCHAL TALUKA
Mode of Investment Percent
House construction 46.7
Household goods and other needs 12.2
Agricultural work 11.5
Repayment of debt 3.5
Ornaments 1.0
Others (marriage, other customary
expenditures) 22.3
Can't say 2.8
Source: S.C. Jain, Block Level Planning: Ucchal Taluka,
Vol.-I, South Gujarat University, 1980.
70
Prior to construction of the dam, 64.9 percent families
lived below the poverty line, whereas after resettlement 95
percent of the families were found to be living under the
poverty line. Examining the role of various developmental
inputs in resettlement and development of production capabili-
ties and social relations of the local people, the picture is
not encouraging. Under the multi-purpose and Tribal Blocks
Scheme the break down of the total expenditure for the years
1975 - 1978 was as follows
Table 8
EXPENDITURE UNDER TRIBAL BLOCK SCHEME 1975-1978 UCCHAL TALUKA
Heads of Total
Development Expenditure Percentage
Block headquarters 26,270,000 46.6
Agricultural Development 2,800,000 4.9
Village and small industries -
Village amenities -
Other programs 27,290,000 48.5
Total 56,360,000 100
Source: S.C. Jain, Block Level Planning: Ucchal Taluka, Vol.
-I, South Gujarat University, 1980.
An expenditure of Rs. 5.6 million over a three year
period gives an expenditure of about Rs. 100 per capita, which
is quite substantial. However, 46.6 percent of this amount
went for headquarter services, and apart from less than five
percent for agriculture there was no expenditure on village
industries or amenities. Among the other programs, the only
notable result achieved was in respect to family planning
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operations. A large part of the other expenditure was sup-
posedly for adult literacy centres, which are practically
nominal in existence today. In the agricultural sector four-
teen of the fifteen wells dug over the three year period were
not in use and twenty-three pumpsets supplied to tribal com-
munities were lying idle for years without being repaired.
Like the performance of the multi-purpose and Tribal
Blocks Scheme, that of the Development Schemes and the
Integrated Rural Development Scheme have had negligible
impact. (Jain, 1980). The only major expenditure incurred
here was towards setting up a chilling plant for milk at the
taluka headquarters at the cost of Rs. 0.95 million, in spite
of the skepticism expressed by earlier studies about the
potential for dairy development in the area. The daily
average milk yields continues to be very low: 3.8 litres for
buffaloes, 0.9 litres for cows, and 0.2 litres for goats. The
actual employment generated under the Block Level Planning
Scheme during 1979 to 1980 was nill.
3:5:3 RESETTLEMENT AND MIGRATION
According to an estimate by the Ucchal taluka Panchayat,
about 45 percent to 50 percent of the entire population of the
taluka migrate to the command area for employment. In a
survey of landless, carried out by the Ukai Navnirman Sangh
(1980) in all the rehabilitated villages, it was found that 65
percent to 75 percent of the landless families migrate for
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work. It was found during the survey conducted by Centre for
Social Studies, Surat, in 1983, that 42 percent of all the
families, landed or landless, migrate for work for varying
periods of time. (Mankodi and Gangopadhyay, 1983). The extent
of migration is greater in the villages on the south bank of
the reservoir due to easier accessibility to the command
15
area.
Table 9
MIGRATION IN THE VILLAGES OF UKAI REGION
# of Households # of Persons found
Village in Sample migrating for work
Tokarwa 74 79
Kamalpur 33 33
Amlapada 25 17
Mota Amlapada 72 57
Khouta Rampura 25 40
Source: Report of the Ukai Navnirman Sangh, 1980, Surat
The impact of resettlement can be seen clearly here.
Whereas just over a decade earlier less than half the landless
labourers were willing to migrate for work even though they
had nothing to fall back upon anymore, after a decade of
resettlement a majority of families, even those who own some
land are forced to migrate for work.
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15. This figure may again be an underestimation because the
survey was conducted around the festival of Holi which is when
most migrant workers like to return to their villages for the
festivities.
According to the Block Level Planning Project, sponsored
by the Government of Gujarat for Ucchal Taluka, nearly 95
percent of the households of the taluka subsist below the
poverty line drawn at a consumption level of Rs. 60 per capita
per month. (Jain, 1980). The breakdown of the households is
as follows:
Table 10
HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION LEVEL - UCCHAL TALUKA
Percentage of households in
Ucchal Taluka
According to
Per Capita per month consumption
income/expenditure levels (i.e. According to
in Rs. expenditure income levels
Less than Rs. 20 51 55
Rs. 21 - 40 36 30
Rs. 41 - 60 8 8
Rs. 61 - 80 3 4
Rs. 81 - 100 1 2
Rs. 101 and above 1 1
Source: S.C. Jain, Block Level Planning:
1, South Gujarat University, 1980.
Ucchal Taluka Vol.
Changes in the habitat and economy can be seen in the
nutritional intake of the population. Prior to resettlement
their diet typically consisted of the following:
Cereals: juwar, banti, kodra, rice.
Pulses: tuwer, val, bhindi, chola.
Animal foods: milk, eggs, fish, meat including wildlife
(boar, deer, hares, and game birds.
Vegetables: various sprouts and gourds.
Fruit: melons, mangoes, and wild fruits.
(Source: Mistry and Purohit, 1982.)
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After resettlement the intake of vegetables and fruit is
negligible and that of animal foods has declined considerably.
There is no more wildlife to hunt for food. With the develop-
ment of pisciculture in the reservoir the catch of fish has
increased but this is almost exclusively for sale outside.
Only fish caught by women in small quantities is for home
consumption. Even milk, which was a very important part of
their diet, is now collected exclusively for sale to the co-
operative dairy for marketing elsewhere. The survey conducted
by CSS, Surat showed a noticeable decline in the score for
diet diversity worked out for each village for the periods
before and after resettlement.
Earlier the consumption of alcohol - though very common -
consisted of drinking mahuda liquor in the evening after the
day's work was over. It was noticed that many men and women
started drinking around 11 A.M. and further that the alchohol
consumed was not always brewed from mahuda flowers, which have
some nutritive value. It is quite possible that enforced
idleness due to unavailability of productive work had led to
an increase in the consumption of harmful brews. (Nistry and
Purohit, 1982).
The tribals who depended on forest produce have suffered
the most due to resettlement in a deforested area. The first
group which traditionally followed the occupation of
extracting catchu from Khair trees have now become shepherds
in the resettled villages. The second group practiced basket
75
weaving and have suffered due to the disappearance of bamboo
forests and the official policy of providing bamboos in bulk
to pulp mills. The rate of extended migration for wage labour
is especially high among these groups.
Changes in other spheres of their lives have resulted
from resettlement. Earlier their dwellings followed a home-
stead settlement pattern which was relatively scattered and
permitted plenty of scope for expansion. After the resettle-
ment the dwellings are clustered very close together and
provide little scope for expansion. This leads to more
cramped and unhygenic living conditions, for both the people
and their domestic animals.
Resettlement has considerably weakened the strong ties to
the family and the community that existed earlier. On the one
hand due to paucity of scope for expansion of dwellings more
people tend to have to live together, whereas on the other
hand it is observed that several families where disputes had
arisen because of sharing of joint landholdings had shrunk to
a miniscule size. (Mistry and Purohit, 1982).
Though marriage customs have not changed substantially as
such, certain differences are observable, especially among the
Vasara tribe. While the bride-price of a Vasara girl in
nearby northern Akkalkuva taluka in Maharashtra is around Rs.
4000/'-, that of a Vasara girl in the resettled area ranges
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between Rs. 500 to Rs. 900. Since even this price is often
beyond the groom's parents ability to pay, elopements, which
involve incurring a much smaller fine - often only a drunken
feast16 - decided by the tribal head, have become more common.
Polygamous marriages have also declined since with smaller
landholdings very few men can afford to pay multiple bride
prices or even support several wives. (Mankodi and
Grangopadhyay, 1983).
Some of the families had converted to Christianity after
resettlement, mainly because conversion seemed to improve
their employment opportunities by opening up a wider avenue of
outside contacts. Marriage and other festivities involving
drinking and dancing to the accompaniment of music have also
declined in frequency due to the pressing need to eke out a
living away from the villages wherever work is available.
In conclusion, as in the case of the benefits of irriga-
tion, electricity, and flood control, the generation of
employment also favoured the command area at the cost of the
obey areas. A decade after completion of the project there
was nothing for the displaced to do, whereas the industrial or
agricultural enterpreneurs in the command areas were favoured
with an unorganized supply of cheap migrant labourers.
16, A village bacchanalia.
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3:6:0 ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF UKAI DAM
Environmental considerations were not paramount in the
selection and planning of the Ukai project. Concern for the
environmental impacts of irrigation projects is a recent
phenomenon in India, and is the result of widely publicized
and intense concern for environmental quality in developed
countries.
No detailed pre-project studies of the probable environ-
mental impacts on the Ukai area were made. Several recent
studies point out adverse environmental effects that the
project has in fact had. These are briefly listed below:
1. Perennial higher flows in the river have adversely
affected riverbed cultivation, communication across the river,
and the water supply diversion work for Surat City. (Mistry
and Purohit, 1982). The Tapti River has changed its course
and the flow is now well away from the infiltration wells of
water supply scheme for Surat City, affecting the infiltration
of water into the wells. Moreover, the riverbed around the
wells has silted up due to the tidal water effect, and due to
flood .pa control the silt cover is not washed away periodi-
cally, as was the case earlier.
2. According to a preliminary survey carried out in 1980 by
the Gujarat Engineering Research Institute, Baroda, 493.41
cubic hectare metres of silt have been deposited in the Ukai
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Reservoir within the first seven years after the impounding of
the reservoir. The grass storage capacity of the reservoir
has decreased by 5.8 percent or 0.85 percent per year.
(Report of the Gujarat Engineering Research Institute on 'Ukai
Dam', 1980).
Against the assumed sedimentation rate of 1.47 hectare
metres per 100 square kilometres, the observed sedimentation
rate in the reservoir is 10.90 hectare metres per 100 square
kilometers. Comparison of erosion affected areas, as inferred
from remotely sensed data and the survey of India topographi-
cal maps, indicates that considerably more area has been
affected by erosion. (Op.cit. above).
3. In at least three talukas in the command area, namely
Bardoli, Kamrej, and Chalthan, crop yields have gone down due
to waterlogging and salinity. (Census of Gujarat, 1971 and
1981). There is a possibility of the soil developing alkali
problems due to excess moistening and impeded drainage, thus
creating unhealthy conditions for plant growth. The area
further downstream in the command areas are prone to water-
logging and salinity due to inadequate outfall conditions,
heavy soils, and impeded drainage.
4. In the areas under the Kakrapar and Ukai right bank com-
mands salt balances in the soils have already been disturbed.
The salinity in these deep black alluvial soils has increased
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and the problem of low yields has started. (Report of the
Gujarat Engineering Research Institute on 'Ukai Dam', 1980).
5. Due to bad maintenance and improper management of canals
and drainage systems, the incidence of water-borne diseases
has increased in the command areas, Malaria, and in the
coastal areas, filaria, are very commmon, with periodic out-
bursts of viral hepatitis, enterie fever, cholera, polio, and
other water-borne diseases. (Sahai Baldev, 1983).
6. It is observed that fishing of Hilsa, which used to be of
commercial importance before the dam was constructed, has
suffered a setback due to decreased discharge downstream of
the dam. There has been an attempt to breed fish in the
reservoir, however. (Op.cit.)
The Ukai project affected totally 89,445 acres of forest
in all. Of these, about 71,000 acres were submerged, while
18,445 acres were felled for resettlement of villages ac-
cording to various official estimates. The total number of
trees which were felled were approximately 2,700,000.
According to the forest department data, forest area in
Surat District under various categories for the period from
1964 to 1971 was as follows.
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Table 11
FOREST AREA - SURAT DISTRICT
(in square kilometers)
Year Reserved Protected Unclassed Private Total
1964-65 1,815.34 3.37 24.66 24.66 1,867.43
1965-66 1,739.24 3.37 34.60 24.06 1,801.27
1966-67 1,728.93 4.89 16.74 24.06 1,774.62
1967-68 346.74 4.89 1,372.86 24.06 1,748.55
1968-69 527.29 4.89 1,080.30 5.64 1,618.12
1969-70 388.97 4.89 1,259.24 5.64 1,658.74
1970-71 691.65 4.90 845.14 5.64 1,547.33
Source: Census of Gujarat, 1971.
Two changes are broadly noticeable about these figures:
first, the considerable reduction of total area over the
period of seven years; second, around 1967-68, when forests
were felled for resettlement presumably, the area under
reserved forests has shrunk drastically.
The extent of forest cover disturbed due to resettlement
is considerably more than the offical estimate of 7,378
hectares. The area of forests cleared which is visible in the
earliest satellite imageries is actually several times larger
than the offical estimate. (Mankodi and Gangopadhya, 1983).
Even in the absence of exact remote sensing data, it is
obvious that this figure is an underestimation of the extent
of deforestation caused by resettlement. The reason for this
was the extensive illicit felling of trees around those reset-
tled villages where some sort of a tree cover remained in the
vicinity. Moreover, immediately after resettlement the econo-
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mic dislocation of the affected population was still fresh and
no other avenues of income were yet available, a large number
of oustees survived or
obtained firewood which
Railway line for dispatch
site to observe a large
firewood travelling in,
passenger trains on this
cutting, transportation,
substantially since the
because trees have become
the sale of headloads of illicitly
they carried to the Tapti Valley
to urban centres. It was a common
number of people with headloads of
or equally often, on top of the
route. Today the extent of illicit
and sale of firewood has declined
early days of resettlement mainly
very scarce within walking distance
of the Tapti Valley Railway line. Today the entire area
between the railway line and the river Nesa is practically
bereft of all trees. People nostalgically remember the time,
not so long ago, when wild beasts stalked the area. (Various
newspaper reports, from 1975 to 1980).
Much of the wildlife in the deforested area has perished
due to the wholesale destruction of its habitat by human
intrusion. The richness of wildlife in the area can be gauged
by remembering a recorded event some hundred years ago that a
Shikari17 had killed ten tigers in five days. This habitat
had not changed substantially until the construction of the
dam.
17. Hunter
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3:7:0 SUMMARY
The Ukai Dam project has shown inadequacy of the land
acquisition act in dealing with resettlement. The compensation
strategy was irrational and people could not reestablish
themselves with meagre cash amount. The compensation for land
was based on the official value of the government register and
hence it was very low compared to the prevalent market price.
The land records were not up to date and several families
could not make legitimate claim for the compensation.
The government machinery was not effective to deal with
the massive resettlement work. Moreover, resettlement
officers were not trained to handle this humane task. The
surveys of the affected villages and people conducted by the
revenue department were inadequate. As a result government
never had correct information about the socio-economic
activities and cultural profile of the displaced tribals.
People lost their most fertile land and were given land
of inferior quality in return. Huge forest area was cleared
to resettle the communities and the ecological impact was
beyond repair. There was no serious effort by the government
to introduce economic activities in tribal communities to make
them self-sufficient and productive. The result was
frustration in the community and several families abandoned
their dwellings to migrate to urban area in search of work.
8.3
At no stage of the planning process people were informed
or consulted regarding the decisions which affected their life
and future. The lack of public participation generated fear
and distrust towards government and resettlement plan. While
the poor tribals were uprooted from their traditional base,
the benefits of the development went to rich farmers residing
in the command area.
The entire resettlement operation missed the human
dimension and planning failed to live up to the philosophy of
welfare state propounded in the Indian constitution.
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CHAPTER 4
In this chapter the case study of Koel-Karo Hydroelectric
Project is presented where government could not acquire land
due to growing public pressure. The chapter discusses the
history of the project and resettlement efforts and problems
of implementation faced by the state government of Bihar. The
suoMAry at the end pinpoints some of the key issues which need
to be resolved for a successful resettlement policy.
4:1:0 THE KOEL-KARO DAM
The idea of tapping the waters of the rivers draining the
Chhota Nagpur plateau to generate electricity originated with
the Bihar Government in the 1950's. After carrying out
initial investigations between 1959 and 1973 the project was
drawn up by the Bihar State Electricity Board along with the
Central Water and Power Commission, the former being respon-
sible for its execution.
The project - estimated to cost Rs. 390 crores plus Rs.
25 lakhs for each day of delay - envisaged the construction of
a 44 metre high dam across the South Koel River at Basia
Village from where it was to be diverted to the adjacent
tributary valley of the North Karo through an approximately 35
kilometre long transbasin canal. Another 55 metre high dam
across the North Karo was to be built near Lohajimis Village,
which would divert the regulated discharge from the Basia
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FIGURE 3 LOCATION OF KOEL-KARO HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT
Reservoir and the Karo River through a headrace tunnel into an
underground power house at Lunpungkhel. The Lunpungkhel
underground power house was to have an installed capacity of
690 megawatts. Along with a smaller powerhouse at the end of
the transbasin canal at Raitoli, with an installed capacity of
20 megawatts, the total capacity of the project was to be 710
megawatts.
The Koel-Karo Project was to be a purely hydroelectric
project and no irrigation or other benefits were envisaged to
accrue from it. The proposal to locate an exclusively hydro-
electric project in the eastern region of India with its large
coal deposits and the consequent preponderance of thermal
power stations needs some comment. According to an official
handout on the project the preponderance of thermal stations
has led to operational difficulties not only for optimal
utilization of thermal stations but also by way of reliability
and quality of power supply, and the Koel-Karo Project would
provide the needed peaking power and stabilize the regional
grid. (Report of the Bihar State Electricity Board, 1970).
Soon after the formulation of the project in 1973 some
land was acquired for campus development and approach roads
and survey work was initiated. However, no real headway was
made for more than seven years in the project, and in 1980-81
the project was given over to the National Hydroelectric Power
Corporation (NHPC) for execution. The NHPC is a Central
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Government enterprise formed in 1975 to plan, promote, and
organize the development of hydroelectric power in all its
aspects. The Koel-Karo Project was the fifth - and the
largest - project undertaken by the NHPC. (Register of Large
Dams in India, 1985).
In spite of the absence of serious financial constraints
the Bihar State Government had no firm timetable for the Koel-
Karo Project when the State Electricity Board was in charge of
its execution. After the NHPC took over, a plan was drawn up
to complete the project within seven years. Shortly there-
after, the tribals who were to be displaced by the proposed
dams formed an informal popular organization called the 'Jan
Sangathan' to agitate against the implementation of the
project until certain issues affecting them were satisfactori-
ly resolved. Subsequent developments have led to a situation
where seven years after the NHPC's taking over the project,
and after the expenditure of an estimated Rs. 4 crores or
more, the project is not only nowhere near completion - in the
opinion of the general manager of the NHPC it is not even at a
standstill but sliding back - there is no possibility of
completing it within several decades and therefore should be
abandoned.
4:2:0 THE PROJECT IMPACT
The Koel-Karo Project has received a lot of adverse
publicity and become the topic of a controversy not only in
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the state of Bihar but also at the national level. The NHPC
feels that until the State Government acquires land for the
project and arranges for the relocation of the people affected
by the dams, the NHPC which is merely an executing agency,
cannot proceed further. On October 31, 1984, the general
manager of NHPC for the Koel-Karo Project advocated the
abandonment of the project. (Mankodi, 1984).
Over four crores rupees have been spent during the last
three years and the large NHPC staff, located at the campus in
Torpa with little or no work to do, has now been thinned out.
While it is estimated that the area of submergence will be
40,000 acres with the total land requirement for the project
being about 50,000 acres18 even this estimate is subject to
confirmation after ground level data collection.
It was initially estimated by the NHPC that about 3,500
families would be affected. This estimate has now been
revised to 6,000 families. The NHPC claims that ten to twelve
villages will be completely submerged. According to other
estimates, seventy-five villages will be affected by the Basia
Reservoir and fifteen to twenty by the Lohajimi Reservoir.
This state of uncertainty about the extent of the impact of
the Koel-Karo Project is due to the fact that no detailed
indepth survey has yet been made. (The Statesman, October
1984).
18. Including about 7,000 or 8,000 acres of forests and
25,000 acres of private land.
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The Director of Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation esti-
mates that 10,000 to 15,000 families will be affected by the
dam, though this is only an approximation in the absence of a
proper survey. The main questions according to him are how
much land to give and where to find so much land - an esti-
mated 25,000 acres. According to the Directorate, not just
adequate but generous compensation has now been offered, but
people want land and since forest land cannot be released
easily anymore this creates a problem.
4:3:0 PROVISION FOR RESETTLEMENT
In the absence of a 'Resettlement Policy', the State
Government has resorted to Land Acquisition Act of 1894 to
clear the site for the project. With rising opposition the
Government has made several decisions to help oustees.
The only landless persons in the area are skilled workers
like blacksmiths or carpenters. The size of landholdings does
vary substantially. In one village it was found that the
largest landholding was seventy-two acres, whereas the smal-
lest one was one and a half acre.
The compensation for acquired land would work out to
between 8,000 and 22,000 rupees per acre for 1982 cases and
more for those cases where acquisition notification was issued
later. The solatium on this has been raised from 15 to 30
percent in September 1984 with effect from April 1984. The
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compensation formula is worked out by capitalizing net annual
income with 50 percent cost of cultivation and multiplying by
15 percent plus the addition of solatium. Since the propor-
tion of landless is very low or practically nil, it was felt
that the relocatees could earn more from interest on bank
deposits of compensation than they could by cultivating the
land proposed to be acquired. (Mankodi, 1984).
Among other facilities offered are reservations for shops
in anticipation of a commercial boom, rural electrification,
proposals to start small industries, and technical training
facilities, apart from the routine facilities made available
under the Integrated Rural Development Program.
4:4:0 RESETTLEMENT AND PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTATION
There are, however, outstanding problems that defy solu-
tion. One pertains to the Sarnas or sacred groves of virgin
forest used for worship. The Directorate is willing to pro-
vide alternative land sites and the cost of religious rituals
involved, but the Pahans19 consider that virgin forests, by
definition, cannot be shifted. Secondly, it is impossible to
meet the demand for new jobs, though a 100 percent reservation
in class IV jobs and 75 percent reservation in class III jobs
for the displaced has been proposed. An Industrial Training
Institute has been started at Basia, but none of the 100
19. Religious leaders.
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students in the last batch received a job, ironically because
the project is at a standstill, (The Statesman, October,
1984).
Since Koel-Karo is a purely hydroelectric project it will
not generate any excess land above the ceiling limit for
irrigated land which can be acquired for the displaced, ac-
cording to the Maharashtra model. Thus the two basic demands
of land for land and adequate employment opportunities cannot
be met. It should be noted here that offers of opportunities
for employment are viewed suspiciously by the people. Fifteen
or twenty years ago a promise had been made to employ five
hundred tribals in the Heavy Engineering Corporation when it
was set up at Hatia near Ranchi. This, however, has not been
implemented yet.
4:5:0 PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROJECT
Today, as things stand, there is a. three-cornered com-
munication gap. NHPC, State Government, and the people have
failed to resolve the differences. The negotiations with
local leaders, though stretched for eight and one-half years,
have proved totally fruitless and are yet at the same point
where they started. The people's main problem is the lack of
proper political representation. Their main demands are
adequate compensation, proper resettlement, land for land,
guarantee of employment in the project, and assurance of
commitment to fulfill the promise. (India Today, April 1983).
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The project cannot start unless the State Government can
go ahead with land acquisition. The NHPC is prepared to
assure proper implementation of any agreement pertaining to
resettlement between the State Government and the people. It
is even prepared to do a sample demonstration resettlement of
one village each in the two dam sites al-Basia and Lohajimi,
but since it is unsure of continuing peoples' support for such
resettlement, it considers this idea a poor risk which may
involve the waste of money without any possibility of assured
returns. The NHPC cannot buy private land for resettlement
unlike the State Government. There is no local blue-print for
resettlement available from the people, and the State's
Directorate of Land Acquisition and Resettlement.
According to the Director, the Directorate is also merely
an implementing agency and the State Government also, on its
own, cannot decide to scrap the project. This is because the
project is designed to provide peaking power to the Eastern
Grid of which Bihar's share is only 25 to 30 percent, and
hence it is the Union Government which will have to decide.
Though NHPC funds the Directorate, it implements the State
Government's policies and the State Government cannot decide
on its own to scrap the project. However, it is felt by the
State Government of Bihar that the project should not be
abandoned because it is a test case and if this project is not
implemented there will be national repurcussions and people
will seek to stop projects everywhere in the country.
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4:6:0 SUMMARY
The Koel-Karo Project represents the state of affairs in
India in the absence of effective resettlement policy. A
stage has come where it is difficult to implement large-scale
development projects unless proper measures are taken to
resettle affected community.
There is no correct figure of the affected villages and
families with the government. The three departments of the
government namely land acquisition, revenue and power, have
three different numbers of affected people. There is
incoherence in the government machinery which reflects in
dealing with the people.
Majority of the affected people are land holders and they
demand land for land. The state government does not have
enough land to offer and compensation in cash is not acceptab-
le to the people because the compensation paid under Land
Acquisition Act is based on the official price and not on the
market value. There is sizeable undeveloped land in the state
of Bihar but government does not have any plans to develop
this land.
Public participation is not possible because there is no
definite resettlement plan with the government. There is no
concrete formula around which negotiation can begin.
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There are several such projects in India today which can
not be implemented due to growing public pressure. In demo-
cratic society development should take people into confidence
and planning should not make some people better off by making
others worse off.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SARDAD SAROVAR NARMADA PROJECT
In this chapter the Sardar Sarovar Narmada Project is
discussed along with its impact on people and environment. It
describes the process by which resettlement policy is being
formulated in the state of Gujarat. The interstate water
dispute and the role of Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT)
award are presented to understand the recommended resettlement
measures. The World Bank has played a vital role by issuing
the guidelines for the Narmada oustees. An attempt has been
made to compare the Ukai Project with the Narmada Project to
examine the differences in resettlement policy, procedure and
implementation. The summary at the end presents the key
issues of resettlement planning in Gujarat.
5: 1:0 THE NARMADA DAM
The river Narmada rises from a holy tank in the midsts of
a cluster of temples on the Amarkantak Plateau in the Shahdol
District of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The Narmada is the
fifth longest river of India. It is, however, the longest
among the west flowing rivers of the country. The river
traverses up to the sea, a distance about 1,312 Km., and
drains an area of about 95,726 square kilometres in the three
states of Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra. The river
is largely untapped because of interstate water disputes and
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FIGURE 4 LOCATION OF SARDAR SAROVAR NARMADA PROJECT
annually about 32 MAF of water on an average flows into the
sea from the river.
Narmada is one of the sacred rivers of India, dotted by a
number of religious shrines all along its course; the impor-
tant ones being Omkareshwar, Mandleshwar, Maheshwar and
Garudeshwar. It is a mighty river with a special place in the
country's legend and history. The river valley has developed
a rich cultural heritage with significant religious stimulus.
With a sizeable tribal population of Bhils, Bhilalas, Gonds,
Korkus, Kirs, Tadvi, Rathwa, Vasava, and Nayka endowed with
rich traditions and diversity, the valley reverberates with
notes of fascinating folklore and folkmusic.
The Sardar Sarovar Narmada Project is unique in India.
It's magnitude in terms of inputs of resources, coverage, and
implication is enormous.
The proposed dam is 155 meters (511.5 feet) high
involving submergence of 370 square kilometres of land area
upstream of the dam, with a gross storage capacity of about
7.7 MAF. Its main canal would be 4,538.6 km. long and at the
distribution system it would be nearly forty thousand kilo-
metres in length. The Narmada River Basin Development Program
eventually will have 329 large dams on its various tribu-
taries, 450 medium sized dams, and 3,000 minor structures.
The command area of the project would cover 2.12 million
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hectares of cultivable land with an annual irrigation of 1.79
million hectares. (Department of Botony, M.S. University of
Baroda, 1983).
The project is also proposed to have two power houses 1)
a River Bed Power House; and 2) a Canal Head Power House. It
is proposed to install six units of 200 MW in the River Bed
and five units of 50 MW in the Canal Head Power House. Thus,
they have 1,200 MW and 250 MW installed capacity respectively.
A project of such magnitude would have profound impact on
both the human and natural environment. It is bound to
disturb the existing human and natural conditions, In fact,
it would create a new eco-system which not only needs to be
identified and understood but also managed.
5:2:0 THE PROJECT IMPACT
In the Sardar Sarovar Project most of the affected area
lies outside Gajarat State. Only nineteen villages will be
submerged in Gujarat itself, whereas thirty-six villages in
Maharashtra State and 182 villages in the State of Madhya
Pradesh will be submerged. All villages are situated in
tribal areas.
The nineteen villages in Gujarat fall in Raipipla Taluka
of Bharuch district and Naswadi and Chhota Udipur Talukas of
Vadodara districts. The total number of families affected in
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Gujarat is 3,222 covering a population of 16,000." According
to the information collected, 2,780 families have cultivation
as their occupation while 542 families are engaged as agricul-
tural labourers. Thus, the main economic activities in the
submergence area are cultivation and agricultural labour. The
total area under submergence is 7,469 hectares of which 1,877
hectares is private land, 1,869 hectares is government waste-
land and the rest, i.e. 8,675 hectares is forest land.
Talukawise details regarding the number of villages, popula-
tion, its occupational and ethnic distribution and submergence
area are given in the Tables 12, 13, 14, and 15.
The total number of private houses affected is estimated
to be 1,526. About 61 Km. length of Cart-track is expected to
go under submergence. Major public amenities affected due to
submergence are school buildings and temples numbering thir-
teen and six respectively. Among the six temples, the temple
of Surpaneshwar is famous for pilgrimage.
5:3:0 INTERSTATE WATER DISPUTE AND TRIBUNAL AWARD
The dispute over the right to submerge an area in the
riparian states was referred to a tribunal21 set up by the
Central Government on October 6, 1969 under the Interstate
20. Totally 13,000 families, 66,000 people from the states of
Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh will be affected.
21. Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal (NWDT)
100
Table 12
ETHNIC GROUPS AFFECTED
Raj pipla
T a 1 u k a
Naswadi Chhota-Udipur Total
Tribal Groups
Tadvi
Rathwa
Dungri Ehil
Vasava
Nayka
Total.Schedule
Tribe
Others
Total population
affected
Source: Narmada Development Department, Government of
Gujarat, October 1986.
Table 13
LAND UNDER SUBMERGENCE (figures in Hectares)
T a 1 u k a
Raj pipla Naswadi Chhota-Udipur
Private land
Cultivable
Other
Total
Government land
Waste land
Forest land
at FLR
Total land under
submergence
1,616.92
1,616.92
1,019.78
2,492.75
5, 129. 45
167.78
167.78
92.85
92.85
49.60
1,877.55
1,877.55
1,069.38
923.52
1, 091. 30 1, 248. 86 7, 469. 69
Narmada Development Department, Government
Gujarat, October 1986.
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6,590
494
873
76
8,033
204
8,237
275
682
55
1,012
13
1,025
560
647
35
1,242
89
1,331
6,590
835
1,823
873
166
10, 287
306
10,593
Total
Source: of
Table 14
VILLAGES COMING UNDER SUBMERGENCE IN GUJARAT
T a 1 u k a
Raj pipla Naswadi Chhota-Udipur Total
# of villages under
submergence
Partial 9 5 2 16
Full 2 - 1 3
Total 11 5 3 19
Source: Narmada Development Department, Government of
Gujarat, October 1986.
Table 15
POPULATION AFFECTED IN GUJARAT
T a 1 u k a
Raipipla Naswadi Chhota-Udipur Total
# person affected 8,305 1,018 1,270 10,593
# families affected 2,410 308 604 3,322
Agriculturists 2,191 191 398 2,780
Landless 219 117 206 542
Narmada Development Department, Government
Gujarat, October 1986
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Source: of
Water Disputes Act of 1956. The Tribunal decided in 1972 that
it had the jurisdiction to give directions to Gujarat for
resettlement of displaced persons.
Accordingly, in 1978 when the Award of the Tribunal was
declared, detailed directions regarding land acquistion, pay-
ment of compensation, and resettlement were given to Gujarat.
It was for the first time that mandatory guidelines for reset-
tlement were set up for a project implemented by the govern-
ment of Gujarat. Several features of the Tribunal's Award are
of special interest. It defines an oustee not just as one
whose property would be submerged, but as a person who, since
at least one year prior to the publication of the notification
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, "has been ordi-
narily residing or cultivating land or carrying on any trade,
occupation, or calling or working for gain in the area likely
to be submerged permanently or temporarily." This definition
of oustee includes landless labourers and others who would be
affected by submergence even if they do not own any land. In
defining the family of an oustee the Award stipulates that
every major son will be treated as a separate family. (Joshi,
1983).
The Tribunal directed that Gujarat will bear all the
costs, charges, and expenses - including establishment charges
- for the resettlement of oustees and oustee families from all
three affected states. Gujarat was also directed to establish
villages in the command area of the Sardar Sarovar Project for
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which it was to acquire necessary lands within two years of
the decision of the Tribunal. Gujarat was also to acquire and
make available one year in advance of submergence, irrigable
lands and house sites for resettlement of oustee families from
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra who were willing to resettle in
Gujarat. It was also directed to pay resettlement grants and
grant-in-aid as per prescribed scales.
Every oustee family was to receive a house site measuring
60 feet by 90 feet, free of cost. Every resettlement site was
to be linked to a main road and certain civic amenities were
to be provided for every group of oustee families resettling
there.
One of the most important directives of the Tribunal
pertained to the allotment of agricultural land. Every dis-
placed family from whom more than 25 percent of its land
holding was acquired was entitle to, and was to be allotted,
irrigable land to the extent of land acquired from it, subject
to the prescribed ceiling in the concerned state22 and a
minimum of two hectares per family. Fifty percent of the
price of the land was to be adjusted against the compensation
payable to the oustee family as an initial installment and the
balance was to be recovered in twenty yearly installments,
free of interest.
22. According to the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, a
farmer can own 22 acres of irrigated land and 44 acres of
unirrigated land.
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Although the directives of the Tribunals pertaining to
rehabilitation stipulated what oustees from the Sardar Sarovar
Project were entitled to receive from the Government of
Gujarat, the latter initially interpreted the directives as
applying only to oustees from Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra,
since the Tribunal was set up to adjudicate a dispute between
states. Accordingly, the decisions were taken to lay down
the standards for amenities to be provided at resettlement
sites for the oustees of large and medium irrigation projects
in the State, who had not already availed themselves of re-
habilition facilities under project-specific policies. (Reso-
lution of the Government of Gujarat, June 1979).
Though this resolution closely followed the directives of
the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award as far as the
definitions of "oustee" and the civic amenities to be provided
in the resettlement villages were concerned, there were
crucial differences between the Tribunal Award and the govern-
ment resolution. Firstly, the resolution considered only
adult married sons as separate families. There were dif-
ferences in the conditions under which land was to be allotted
to oustee families. Accordingly, joint landholders were not
to be considered as separate families for the purpose of the
allotment of agricultural land, even if they constituted
separate families according to the definition of "family"
which was adopted from the Tribunal Award. Secondly, there
was no commitment in the resolution to provide irrigable land
or land in the area benefitted by a project. The housing
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sites to be provided to oustees according to the resolution
were also smaller than those prescribed in the Tribunal Award.
Whereas the latter prescribed plots of 5,400 square feet per
oustee family, provided for housing plots of 3,267 sq. ft. to
agriculturist families and 2,178 sq. ft. to nonagriculturist
families in the resettlement sites.
There were other minor differences between the provisions
of the Award and the government resolution. For example,
there was a provision for the construction of percolation
tanks or village ponds in resettlement sites only where
feasible and not for every five hundred oustee families as
directed by the tribunal.
The resolution specified that revenue wasteland was to be
made available in the first instance for resettlement. Alter-
natively forest department wastelands and degraded forests or
cultivable land within forests was to be made available for
resettlement of oustees from irrigation projects.
5:4:0 LAND ACQUISITION AND PUBLIC RESPONSE
The government's policy regarding the acquisition of
land, payment of compensation and rehabilitation of displaced
persons, and its implementation as of 1983, caused considerab-
le concern, which was reflected in the activities of organiza-
tions among the oustees and other voluntary agencies, probes
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by the judiciary and the press, public demonstrations around
the project site, and subsequent changes in the policy itself.
Several voluntary organizations became interested in the issue
of the displacement of tribual oustees and sought to pres-
surize the government to change its policy. It was pointed
out that the oustee population was totally dependent on the
land for their survival, and that since landholdings tended to
be joint ones due to various reasons, the average size of
holdings did not reflect the extent of dependence of oustee
families on land. Typically several families depended on
every holding registered in the record of rights. Making at
least five acres of alternative land available only to land-
owners registered in the records of rights would thus deprive
a large number of oustee agricultural families of their only
source of livelihood. As a result of the dependence of a
large number of families on a limited base of privately owned
land among the oustees, there was a large-scale prevalence of
"unauthorized" cultivation of revenue department wasteland and
forest department land. Unless oustee families dependent on
such "authorized" cultivation were sufficiently compensated to
enable them to acquire alternative means of livelihood, they
would be pauperized.
The practice of encouraging private purchase of land by
the oustees from cash compensation given to them for their
acquired land and houses also came in for criticism. There
was a considerable shrinking of landholdings due to increases
in the price of available private land and rampant exploita-
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tion of illiterate and unsophisticated oustees by sellers. It
was therefore suggested by voluntary organizations that alter-
native land which was acceptable to the oustees should be
acquired or purchased by the government and given to all
oustee agriculturist families as per the provisions of the
Tribunal Award, if the standard of living of the oustees was
to be maintained or improved - a principle to which the re-
habilitation program should be committed.
During 1984-85, after a series of meetings, discussions,
requests and applications by the voluntary organizations arti-
culating the oustees cause had seemingly failed to bring about
any changes in the governments rehabilitation policy and its
implementation by concerned officials, the campaign to pres-
sure the government was intensified by public demonstations
(on March 8, 1984 and January 15, 1985) in the first of which
several thousand protestors marched from the dam site to the
project office. (Times of India, 25 February, 1984).
5:5:0 RESETTLEMENT AND PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION
During 1985 a Special Leave Petition on behalf of some
oustees was admitted by the Supreme Court of India. While
this matter is still sub judice, the Court appointed a commis-
sion in May 1985 which was to ascertain, whether tribals
dispossessed of the land in their possession or occupation
have been given any alternative land or whether suitable
rehabilitation has been provided for them. The Commission,
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which submitted its report in July 1985, found that tribals
had been dispossessed of their land before receiving alterna-
tive lands or compensation. It also found that no real
attempt at resettlement had been done for the inhabitants of
Vadgam, Even the alternative land that some of them had
purchased had been done on the initiative of the cultivators
themselves were trying to find suitable lands for purchase.
This has been made very difficult as the sellers of land are
in a better bargaining position than the buyers. Rates of
land soar as sellers take advantage of the urgency and plight
of the tribals who are being dispossessed. The Commission
also visited some resettlement villages and found that "the
government has shown indifference and inefficiency" in the
allotment of alternative lands. Landless tribal oustees were
provided neither land for cultivation nor any other means of
livelihood; grazing lands and public amenities were either
inadequate or not provided at all, and families and villages
had been split due to partial acquisition of land.
The Commission recommended, among other things, a uniform
application of the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award to
oustees of Gujarat as well; the regularization of government
wastelands and forest lands which are in the possession of the
oustees; special schemes for landless tribals; the involvement
of social organizations in the resettlement and rehabilitation
effort, the provision of full facilities in the resettlement
villages; and the formation of a special committee of volun-
tary field workers to monitor rehabilitation and resettlement
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of oustees for ten years. (Progress Report No.21, March 1986,
Government of Gujarat).
5:6:0 ROLE OF WORLD BANK IN RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS
In March 1985 the World Bank approved the Sardor Sarovar
Project for the commitment of funds, and an agreement was
signed which laid down certain conditions with regard to
resett lement.
The agreement specified that the provisions of the
Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal Award would be applicable to
oustees from all the States, including Gujarat. It also
stipulated that the remaining objective of the resettlement
and rehabilitation plan for the oustees were to ensure that
promptly after their displacement the oustees would improve,
or at least regain, the standard of living they enjoyed prior
to their displacement; that they would be relocated as village
units, village sections, or families in accordance with their
preferences; that they would be fully integrated with the host
community; and that they would be provided with appropriate
compensation and adequate social and physical rehabilitation
infrastructure.
The agreement stipulated that the resettlement plan would
ensure adequate participation by the oustees. It also
reiterated that each landed oustee was entitled to a minimum
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of two hectares of irrigable land and, each landless oustee
will be rehabilitated in the agricultural or non-agricultural
sectors and shall be entitled to a stable means of livelihood.
The level of compensation payable to oustees was to be based
on the current market value of land of equivalent size, loca-
tion, and comparable quality in areas provided for and accep-
table to each oustee. Irrigable land was to be allocated to
landed oustees as per the Tribunal Award and in no case were
cash payments to be made in substitution for actual resettle-
ment. (Progress Report No.21, March 1986 Government of
Gujarat).
According to the conditions of the agreement Gujarat was
to make institutional arrangements acceptable to the World
Bank for planning, coordinating, and implementing the reset-
tlement of the oustees. It was also to employ suitable
research institutions for monitoring and evaluating the imple-
mentation of the plan for resettlement for a period of ten
years commencing from 1985. Such institutions were to prepare
semi-annual and annual reports of their findings and recommen-
dations. Gujarat was also to form an advisory committee for
the implementation of the plan according to guidelines laid
down by the agreement.
As a result of all these developments government passed
resolutions which substantially changed the rehabilitation
policy of Gujarat at least as far as the oustees from Sardar
Sarovar were concerned. The first resolution pertained to the
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ex-gratia payment of compensation to those oustees of Sardar
Saraovar Project who were in possession of government waste-
land or forest land. This government resolution granted that
cultivators of government wasteland or forest land would be
paid compensation at the same rate as that paid for privately
owned land. Furthermore, every adult cultivator of such land
was to be allocated alternatively agricultural land of the
same area as that cultivated by the oustee, subject to a
minimum of three acres and a maximum of five acres. Oustees
who had constructed houses on such lands were to be paid
compensation for the houses at the same rate at which it was
paid for dwellings constructed on privately owned land, and
they would be allowed to take the construction material of the
houses. (Resolution of the Government of Gujarat, May 1985).
The government accepted that the provisions of the Tri-
bunal Award will be applicable to oustees of Sardar Sarovar
from Gujarat as well, and reproduced the principles and objec-
tives of the resettlement and rehabilitation plan as stipu-
lated in the agreement with the World Bank. (Resolution of
the Government of Gujarat, November 1985).
Each oustee agricultural family was to be offered land it
was entitled to at three different places from the lands
vested in the Revenue Department and the Irrigation Department
of the government of Gujarat, and lands available to the
government as a result of acquisition in the command area of
112
the S:ardar Sarovar Project, or under the Gujarat Agricultural
Land Ceiling Act. The offered lands were to be transferred to
them to the extent acquired from them, subject to a minimum of
two hectares and the maximum prescribed in the ceiling limit
for agricultural land in Gujarat.
If the lands offered to the oustee agricultural families
were not acceptable to them or if they were unable to suggest
any alternative lands that could be allotted to them, the
government would help the oustee agricultural families to
purchase private land from the amount of compensation payable
to them through a committee appointed for the purpose. There
was, however, no commitment to make available any minimum area
of land to oustee agriculturists if the purchase of private
lands was involved.
A list of landless families who required government help
in seeking employment was to be prepared, and employment
schemes for such oustee families were to be prepared in co-
ordination with local officers implementing central schemes
for employment and rural and tribal development.
All the affected persons from the area going under sub-
mergence in the Sardar Sarovar Project in Gujarat were to be
entitled to these facilities for resettlement and rehabilita-
tion. The government has also taken decisions that agricul-
turist oustee families would be provided 75 percent subsidy,
and landless oustee families would be provided 90 percent -
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and in some cases, 100 percent - subsidies for agriculture and
other occupations. (Resolution of the Government of Gujarat,
February, 1986).
5:7:0 RESETTLEMENT POLICY
The families affected by submergence due to Sardar
Sarovar Narmada Project are to be resettled as per the terms
of the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal's Award. The major
government decisions regarding resettlement of displaced
people can be summarized as follows:
1. The affected families shall be persuaded to settle
down in Gujarat in large numbers because the NWDT award gives
them a right to have agricultural land in the command area of
the Sardar Sarovar Project.
Totally 13,000 families, 66,000 people from the states of
Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Madhya Pradesh will be resettled in
Gujarat. It is a gigantic task and the success depends upon
effectiveness of the implementation.
2. In the command area, parts of the holdings of persons
who own land beyond a particular limit could be acquired to
the extent possible and made available to the oustee families.
The affected families will also be encouraged to purchase land
directly.
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According to the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling Act, a
farmer can own 44 acres of unirrigated land and 22 acres of
irrigated land. There will be excess land after creation of
the irrigation facilities which will be utilized for resettle-
ment purposes.
3. Displaced persons who are tenure holders, tenants,
government lessees or owners of other property whose lands
have been acquired for the project will be given rehabilita-
tion grant and grant-in-aid as indicated below. These grants
will be increased, considering the price rise.
A. Rehabilitation Grant - Rs. 150 per month per family for:
i. Eighteen months where no land or uncultivated land is
made available.
ii. Six months if cultivated land is made available.
This grant will be paid in three installments. The date
for the purpose of giving a rehabilitation grant would be the
date of dispossession of land of the displaced persons.
B. Grant-in-aid. The grant-in-aid will cover the following:
i, Difference between the compensation which the dis-
placed family gets for the agriculture land and the
price it has to pay for the agriculture land that
will be allotted to the family.
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ii. Cost of transportation - minimum Rs. 200 or as may be
considered reasonable by the project Resettlement
Officer.
Rehabilitation grant of Rs.150 per month is not adequate
to support the family, especially in the early period of
resettlement when there is no other source of income.
4. The compensation shall be given to the oustees three
years before submergence. By doing so they will get a period
of three years for resettlement. The land acquisition pro-
ceedings will be according to the Land Acquisition Act of
1894. The price of the land in the submergence area has been
depressed for the last several years. For calculating the
compensation for land under submergence the price of similar
land in the command area will be taken as the basis and not
the price based on the transactions in the submergence area.
The compensation of the residential buildings shall be deter-
mined according to the provisions of the Land Acquisiton Act.
The compensation amount will be credited to the bank account
of the oustees and they will be permitted to operate upon it
only for payment for the land and other incidental and con-
sequential purposes. The owner of the house will be permitted
to dismantle it and take its material to the place where he
wants to settle himself.
This is a good provision and people will have enough cash
amount and time to arrange for their resettlement.
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5. There are many families in the affected villages who
have no assets and work as labourers. These families will not
get any compensation under the provisions of the Land Acquisi-
tion Act, but keeping in view their contribution to village
economy, they are also to be compensated. This will be in the
nature of ex-gratia payment. Every such family will be
granted an amount (Rs. 3,600 calculated on the basis of 1979
price structure) to keep the family above the poverty line and
help it resettle at some other place.
The ex-gratia payment of Rs.3600 to landless family is
not adequate to settle in a new place. The first priority of
a displaced family would be to build a house and the pre-
scribed amount is not enough even to build a small shelter of
mud and thatch.
6. If 75 percent of the land of the holdings of a family
is acquired then family can offer the remaining 25 percent
also for acquisition.
In the past, many families have suffered due to partial
acquisition of land. In Ukai Project several families could
not continue with agriculture as government acquired a major
portion of their land. This provision will definitely help
the affected families.
7. The compensation under the Land Acquistion Act is
calculated on the basis of the price prevalent on the day of
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issue of notification under Section 4 of the Act. The land
acquisition proceedings continue for years after issuance of
notification under Section 4 of the Act and there is an inter-
val of many years between the date of notification and actual
payment of compensation. Prices are rising every year and it
will not be justified to pay compensation based on the price
prevalent on the date of issue of notification. Keeping in
view the price rise, the quantum of compensation will be
suitably increased.
In the absence of a set formula, there is a possibility
of subjectivity in determining compensation. There should be
specific guidelines on which compensation can be worked out.
Moreover, there is no clarity as to how the difference between
official value and market value will be adjusted.
8. Some families are indebted to co-operatives and
banks. It is to be decided whether compensation should be
paid after deducting this debt. It is evident that if the
loan amount is deducted from the compensation, these oustee
families will be left with very little money for their reset-
tlement. Both actions are, therefore, to be kept separate.
Full amount of compensation shall be paid to the oustee
families and no deduction shall be made for it. The banks who
have advanced loans will take separate action for its
recovery.
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9. The land acquisition program would be divided into
five stages looking to the size of the work. The first stage
will cover those villages which will first be submerged. The
fifth stage will include those villages which will be the last
to be submerged.
10. The oustee agriculturist families will be alloted a
150 square metre residential plot and the other oustee
families will get 100 square metres plot free of cost. The
following civil amenities will be provided in the resettlement
site.
- One primary school (three rooms) for every one hundred
families.
- One panchayat ghar-cum-community hall for every five
hundred families.
- One dispensary for every five hundred families.
- One children's park for every five hundred families.
- One seed store for every five hundred families.
- One drinking water well with trough for every five
hundred families.
- One tree-platform for every five hundred families.
- One tank for every five hundred families.
- One religious place of worship for every one hundred
families.
- Roads to connect main road.
- Playground.
- Cremation and burial ground.
- Thrashing ground.
- Open gutters.
- Electricity,
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- Social amenities for each municipal town viz.., water
supply, sanitary arrangements, etc.
- Cattle stand.
- Any other facility (such as middle school) which was
existing in the affected village.
11. The oustee families will carry with them their
livestock to the new site. The new site will be selected in
such a way as to have sufficient pasture land and water supply
for the livestock.
The government will have to explore other alternatives
such as developing barren and degraded or cultivable wasteland
because there is already a scarcity of pasture land in the
region.
12. The affected families of the submerged area will be
given priority in employment in the project. Special efforts
will be made to give employment to the educated youths. If
necessary they will be given training also. The affected
families will be engaged in the new trade of business. Ancil-
lary industries will also spring up as a result of construc-
tion work. The affected families will be given preference in
allotment of shops and land. In order to promote the spirit
of self-employment amongst oustees, they will be assisted in
getting loans from the commercial banks to purchase trucks,
tractors, trollies, etc. and as far as possible these machines
will be utilized on the project work.
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The well intended provision raises some doubts. It is
not clear where and when the training will be given and what
facilities or stipend will be offered to the trainee. There
is no mention of placement service and the Ukai experience has
shown that tribals are reluctant to undergo training without a
definite employment plan.
13. The project has the responsibility to transport the
personal effects of the affected families, The project has to
arrange for trucks. The transport expenses shall be borne by
the project.
14. A huge lake will be formed as a result of the
construction of the dam. Fisheries development programs will
be taken up on a large scale. Many families will get employ-
ment in this scheme, Pisciculture will give impetus to many
trades and industries.
The proposed scheme can be successful provided marketing
and other infrastructure are created. There are 750 families
along 150 Km. river stretch downstream of Narmada River, who
make a living out of catching hilsa fish. The construction of
the Narmada Dam will interfere with hilsa migration and ap-
proximately 2,000 people will become unemployed. These people
should be given priority in the reservoir pisciculture.
15. For all forest areas submerged in the project an
equal area will be taken up under compensatory forestry.
121
Wildlife in -submerged forests will be guided to adjacent
localities. Protection of wildlife will be the responsibility
of the forest authorities. The project will bear the affores-
tation costs. The Forest Department will cut the forest in a
planned way. Timber and other wood will be available in
sufficient quantities in the submerged area. Therefore cut-
ting of trees in the adjoining forest areas will have to be
stopped. New factories have to be established to utilize
forest wood. Oustee families of the submergence area will be
employed in new factories. The forest cutting will result in
a huge supply of timber and other wood. The affected families
will be given timber for house building at their relocation
places at concessional rates. The affected families will be
given preference in supply of steel and cement.
16. Trees standing within four metres depth of the lake
will not be felled. Only such species of trees shall be cut
which cannot survive in standing water and, in this strip of
four metres, cultivation will not be done even though it might
have been going on at present. Trees will be planted in this
strip. This arrangement is essential for preventing silting
of the lake.
17. Some portion of the rail track is coming under
submergence and new rail line is to be laid. The land avail-
able from the present railway line shall be utilized for
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resettlement of the oustees. If this land is not fit for
resettlement or cultivation, it may be used for afforestation.
18. All religious places coming under submergence are to
be reconstructed. Articles of archaeological importance are
to be kept in museums.
Often the significance of a religious place is not only
due to a monument or building but to the place and location
which has historic importance. The archaeological survey
could help identify other locations having similar potential
for development.
19. In order to ensure consistent involvement of oustees
in the resettlement program, an Advisory Committee shall be
constituted at the village and district levels. The state
government may constitute one Advisory Board at the government
level to assist in resettlement.
This provision has potential to encourage public partici-
pation. The religious leaders and voluntary agencies working
at grassroot level could plan an important role in mobilizing
people's coorperation. They should be given due representa-
tion in the village and district advisory committees.
20. Full exemption of registration fees and stamp duty
shall be given to oustee families purchasing land in the
command area.
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5: 8: 0 RESETTLEMENT: SARDAR SAROVAR NARMADA PROJECT V IS A
VIS UKAI PROJECT
There are many minor differences of detail, some of which
are negligible, but reveal progressive or regressive tenden-
cies in the evolving policy governing resettlement.
Transportation to the relocation sites was free in the
case of Ukai Project, while it is charged for in the case of
Narmada Project. Though oustees of Narmada Project are en-
titled to a rehabilitation grant against which transportation
charges are adjusted, unlike in the case of the former, the
grant is often insufficient to cover the cost of transporta-
tion. Oustees of the Ukai Project could hire back unutilized
land which was acquired from them by paying two times the
normal revenue levied, whereas at Narmada Project some of them
have had to pay twelve times the revenue normally levied for
the land. On the other hand, oustees of Ukai had to pay for
the housing plots received in the resettlement sites from the
compensation received by them whereas oustees of Sardar
Sarovar are entitled to free housing plots, which are also
larger in area.
On the other hand several major differences between the
two resettlement programs stand out. Resettlement at Ukai was
completely project specific and ad hoc, whereas it is somewhat
better planned, more general, and governed by more specific
directives in the case of Sardar Sarovar. The former had no
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other objectives besides the relocation of oustees and was
implemented by project bureaucracy with no special aptitude,
training, or guidance. The latter is guided by clearly stated
objectives mandated by the Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal
Award, the agreement with the World Bank, and the guidelines
laid down by the Government of India for the rehabiliation of
tribals displaced by developmental projects. Also implementa-
tion is to be carried out by an administrative machinary which
is specifically set up for the purpose and better prepared to
perform the task.
While over 16,000 families were displaced by Ukai
Project, it received no publicity or the benefit of any social
science expertise during the implementation of the resettle-
ment program. The non-governmental or voluntary organizations
involved in working with the oustees of Ukai Project adopted a
basically collaborationist attitude and facilitated the
government's task. In the case of Narmada Project though only
two or three thousand families in Gujarat are affected, the
problems of displacement and resettlement have received very
wide publicity and have been the subject of extensive social
science survey research. The voluntary organizations involved
in working with the oustees have often adopted a confron-
tationist stance and have scrutinized the resettlement policy
of the government and its implementation more effectively. As
mentioned earlier, the interstate problems arising from the
construction of Ukai Dam were also solved easily and amicably,
whereas those arising from the construction of Narmada Dam had
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to be resolved by the setting up of a Tribunal under the
Interstates Dispute Water Act, 1956.
Resettlement of oustees from Ukai Dam was on forest land,
which could be easily released for the purpose at that time.
It was therefore possible to achieve genuine communal reloca-
tion of affected villages. Due to the unavailability of
forest land for resettlement in the case of Narmada Project
because of the Forest (Conservation) Act passed in 1980, the
resettlement of oustees to date has been largely on private
lands and marginally on government wasteland. As a result,
the resettlement has tended to scatter the oustee population
over a fairly large area so far.
5:9:0 SUMMARY
The Sardar Sarovar Narmada Project is a landmark in the
history of water resource development in India. This ambi-
tious project has raised nationwide controversy but at the
same time has done pioneering work in formulating resettlement
policy. The several decisions, resolutions of the state
government, reveal a positive attitude of the administration
towards affected people. The allotment of land to the land-
less, resettlement in the command area of the project, reset-
tlement grant ot the affected families, cash compensation as
per the market value are some of the laudable policy deci-
sions. It is too early to say how the policy will be imple-
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mented as it is the responsibility of the Gujarat government
to settle 68,000 people from two other states also, namely
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, There is a scarcity of land
and the task to find land for the resettlement is enormous.
The resettlement policy is silent about the economic
opportunities for the displaced people. So far, government
has not come up with a definite plan for employment genera-
tion. It is assumed that many people will be absorbed in the
construction work but over and above that there should be an
economic development strategy to sustain the village life.
Government needs to explore other developmental options to
suit the lifestyle of the people, such as social forestry,
fishery,, integrated rural development, crafts and cottage
industries. In all the resettlement schemes in India, so far,
government assumed that their task was over once house site
and other amenities were provided in the resettled village.
But resettlement begins only after this stage when people find
meaningful work, employment to regain their confidence and
become self-sufficient.
Often good policies fail if not implemented properly.
The commission appointed in 1985 by the Supreme Court of India
to evaluate the resettlement work of Narmada Project, cate-
gorically stated that the government had shown indifference
and inefficiency in implementing resettlement plan. This
brings out the limitations of government machinery to handle
this complex task.
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It is obvious that resettlement work of such a magnitude
can not be achieved without people's cooperation. Unfor-
tunately, in the Narmada Project, government has not made
enough effort to bring people to participate in the planning
process. As a result, there is fear and a feeling of uncer-
tainty in the minds of people about the intentions of the
government,
The lessons learned from other projects in India, e.g.
Koel-Karo, suggest that development can not take place without
people's cooperation and people will not cooperate unless they
find their new settlement promising for their future.
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CHAPTER 6
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this chapter the major findings of the resettlement
practice in India are discussed at length. The lessons drawn
from the three case studies, and other projects which are
being implemented in India, are used to formulate the basis
for a resettlement policy. The second part of the chapter
represents recommendations for a resettlement policy under
four aspects, viz, the major policy choices, the major options
for resettlement plan, the development options and the ad-
ministrative mechanism to implement resettlement policy. The
chapter ends with conclusion and suggestions for future
research.
6:1:0 MAJOR FINDINGS
1. Antiquated Land Acquisition Act - 1894
The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was passed by the then
British Government and the same is made enforceable even
today. The Act is not specially meant for acquiring land for
large-scale development works such as irrigation and dams, it
is applicable also for all types of 'public purpose' all over
the country. The act does not go beyond prescribing compensa-
tion to legally entitled private property owners.
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There are problems in the Act of determining compensation
based on the official value which is always undervalued. In
all three case studies it was found that people resisted the
compensation strategy. The delay in the land acquisition
process and partial acquisition of land has raised several
social and economic issues. These problems are discussed at
length in Chapter II under the heading 'Problems of Land
Acquisition Act - 1894',
2. Inadequate Land
Where land is given in lieu of acquired land, the area is
often too small to be economical. In the Ukai Project the
maximum land offered to the people was only four acres. But
in the old village, many families cultivated more than ten
acres of land. In Koel-Karo Project, people are demanding
land for land but government does not have excess land to
offer to all the affected people. In the Narmada Project,
government is finding it difficult to resettle 68,000 people
because land in command area is limited, and there is no
effort so far to look for other alternatives.
3. Underestimation of the Number of Displaced Persons
It is commonly observed that the administration does not
have a correct number of affected people, due to the lack of
proper survey and data collection. In Koel-Karo project,
three concerned departments state three different figures of
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affected families. In the proposed Tehri Dam in the state of
Uttar Pradesh, between 20,000 and 30,000 people will be dis-
placed, according to the project authorities. However, local
sources assert that as many as 70,000 persons will be dis-
placed (Dogra, 1982).
Similarly, in the Bedti Project in the state of Karna-
taka, the estimated number of oustee was 1,500 but actually
5,193 people had to be evacuated (Sharma and Sharma 1981).
This incoherence is due to the absence of a resettlement
organization at state level. At present there are different
departments taking decisions on their own without much coor-
dination. In the case of Koel-Karo Project, even today the
government does not have an exact figure as to how many
families will be affected by the dam.
4. Lack Of Public Participation
The study of various development projects and resettle-
ment procedures indicate that people were hardly consulted in
making vital decisions affecting their life and future. The
government officers, while selecting the site for a new
village, never consulted the people or a village head and as a
result the people often refused to move to the new place.
Amenities provided in the resettlement villages are often
not as per the wish of the people. The priest and religious
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heads of the village have great influence over the people and
often their neglect has resulted in failure of resettlement
schemes. The Koel-Karo Project is proof enough where people
did not accept the government offer because there was no
provision made for the availability of virgin forests for
worship and other rituals in the resettlement sites.
In the Ukai Project as well as in the Narmada Project,
government has not made any effort to bring people to partici-
pate in the planning process. This has resulted in feelings
of uncertainty and fear in the minds of people regarding
government's intentions.
5. Anomaly In Distribution Of Project Benefits
Dams are generally constructed in tribal areas. It has
been noticed that while the head works of development projects
are situated in tribal region, poor people lose their land but
the irrigation and power benefits are usually availed of in
the low country where tribal population is in a minority.
In Narmada Project, the Tribunal Award has compelled
government to give land to the affected families in command
area. Whereas in Ukai Project there was no such provision at
the time of displacement to provide people with an alternative
piece of land in the benefitted area.
132
6. Piecemeal Approach To Resettlement
It is evident from the Ukai Dam that the government never
had a comprehensive resettlement policy, and numerous isolated
resolutions passed by the different departments of the govern-
ment over a period of five years reveal the piecemeal
character of resettlement procedure.
Even in the Sardad Sarovar Narmeda Project, Gujarat
government was reluctant to offer several resettlement provi-
sions to the oustees of their own state but succumbed to the
people's pressure as the protest was building up. In the case
of Koel-Karo, the same disjointed approach is seen and it is
obvious that people can get more concession, if they unite and
stand adamant.
7. Resettlement Planning Without Developmental Inputs
The resettlement planning in India does not incorporate
social and economical development strategy for the resettled
people. Government assumes that their task is over once
alternative house sites and certain amenities are provided in
the new village. Usually many people get employed in the
construction work of the project, but that is not enough to
sustain the development of the community. The aim of reset-
tlement should be to make people economically productive and
self-sufficient so that they develop confidence and overcome
the brunt of evacuation.
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In the case of Ukai Project there were no developmental
inputs to enhance the standards of living. Instead people
became poor and were forced to abandon their village in search
of work. In Koel-Karo Project too, there was no other plan
except offering jobs on the project site and government
organization. The Narmada resettlement plan is equally silent
about the development aspects for the displaced community.
8. Interstate Dispute
An entirely different set of problems arise as a result
of disputes between governments of different states with
regard to the distribution of the benefits and costs of
projects. Such problems are frequent in India since the areas
affected by such projects quite often straddle different
states,
The thirteen year delay and the resulting escalation in
the costs of the Narmada Project due to a dispute between the
states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan
is a case in point. The resettlement of oustees from the Pong
Dam in the state of Himachal Pradesh, in the Rajasthan Canal
area was also marred by a dispute between the two concerned
states about the number of families to be resettled.
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6:2:0 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESETTLEMENT POLICY
The three case studies, viz., Ukai Dam, Koel-Karo, and
Sardad Sarovar Narmada Project reveal that the resettlement
measures taken so far in India are not comprehensive and face
several problems of implementation. In spite of the fact that
the tribal people have been given a special place in the
Indian constitution, the national government has not yet seen
to their needs.
When the Indian National Congress, the champion of the
cause of tribal development, became the ruling party after
independence, special provisions were made in the constitution
for their development. The Tribal Policy, as it is known
today, apart from the constitutional provisions, is the con-
tribution of the late prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. He
advocated five principles known as the "tribal panchshil"
which are as follows:
1) People should develop along the lines of their own
genius and we should avoid imposing anything on them. We
should try to encourage their own traditional arts and culture
in every way.
2) Tribal rights in land and forests should be
preserved.
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3) We should try to train and build up a team of their
own people to do the work of administration and development.
4) We should not over administer these areas or over-
whelm them with a multiplicity of schemes. We should rather
work through and not in rivalry with, their own social and
cultural institutions.
5) We should judge results, not by statistics or the
amount of money spent, but by the quality of human character
that is evolved. (Singh, 1980).
Though questions regarding the so called progressiveness
of these principles have been raised from time to time, the
second principle very clearly says that the rights of tribals
in land and forests should be preserved. Any policy for
resettlement of the tribals has to be in line with this larger
national policy. Such a policy of resettlement must aim at
the objective of giving them an appropriate share in the
development, reenacting new settlements within their own en-
vironment and giving some land to all oustees, even to the
landless, with assurance of employment.
The proposed resettlement policy has four components.
The first three deal with the major policy choices and sug-
gests different possibilities for resettlement. The second
component recommends major options for making land available
for resettlement, the third proposes alternative development
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plans for resettled community. The fourth component gives
recommendations for administrative mechanism and aims at
creating an organizational structure to implement policy
effectively.
6:2:1 MAJOR POLICY CHOICES
In order to ensure that every section of the displaced
community is given equal opportunity and fair treatment, a
range of choices should be offered to them. Some major
choices are given below:
1. Resettlement Plus Full Cash Compensation
This policy includes payment of full cash compensation
equivalent to the market price of the property to the dis-
placed plus a government financed resettlement plan without
any additional cost to the displaced.
In the case of Narmada project this choice has now been
offered to the people. Under this policy people will be
compensated for their land, house, or other property and will
be given a house plot, a miminim of four acres of land, and a
resettlement grant in the new site. In the case of Ukai
Project this scheme was implemented but the compensation paid
was not according to the market price and agricultural land
offered in the new location was of inferior quality. Hence it
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became difficult for people to support their joint families
which had cultivated large tracts of land in the old village.
2. Resettlement Only (Land for Land)
This choice offers specified amounts of land in govern-
ment planned resettlement areas without any cash payment.
This scheme has not been tried in India but it has poten-
tial to succeed if the land offered is very fertile and has
irrigation potential, e.g. giving land in the command area of
the project,
3. Cash Compensation With Partial Assistance
This choice includes full payment of cash equivalent to
the market price of the property plus some assistance in
resettling the displaced. The nature of assistance can range
from housing grants, simple transportation facilities, job
training programs, interest free loans, and other incentives
to the displaced.
This policy was implemented in Ukai Project where many
people who refused to resettle in the new site were given
assistance to resettle themselves by giving loan/grants and
job training. But the scheme did not work since there was no
placement service along with the training. Eventually people
preferred to migrate to urban areas to find a job. Moreover,
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the compensation offered was not according to the market price
hence whatever cash money people received was not enough to
reestablish themselves elsewhere.
4. Cash Compensation Only
This policy involves paying cash compensation equivalent
to the market price without any extra responsibility on the
government.
In the Ukai Project, there were several families who for
some reason did not wish to accept government's help and
generosity in resettling them. Out of 16,080 families dis-
placed by the project, approximately 2,000 families moved away
on their own after accepting compensation. The amount of
compensation was not adequate as it ranged between Rs.450 to
Rs.670 only.
In the case of Narmada Project, government has shown
willingness to help such families by increasing the rate of
compensation.
6:2:2 MAJOR OPTIONS FOR RESETTLEMENT PLAN
The above mentioned policy choices have two major facets,
viz., resettlement and compensation in cash. If resettlement
is accepted by the people then it raises other policy options
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as to how to resettle community. There are basically two
models:
1) Resettle the entire community as it is in a new place
and
2) break the community into smaller groups and resettle
them with existing villages,
In both cases new settlement must be designed with great care
to reflect the people's life style, cultural tradition, and
community needs. Both the models have constraints of land
availability. In the Ukai Project the government cleared
forests to resettle people but this option is now closed after
the new forest act of 1982 which prohibits clearing of forests
for resettlement purposes. In light of this fact, it is
possible to find land in the following ways.
1. Barren and Degraded Land Classified as Forest
Such land can be reclaimed and upgraded to use for
resettlement purposes.
2. Cultivable Wasteland
Generally such land is without irrigation facilities and
has high potential for agriculture if the infrastructure is
provided, such as ordinary wells or tube wells.
140
3. Cultivable Land Rendered Excess Under Ceiling Rules for
Irrigated Land
In the state of Gujarat under the Agricultural Land
Ceiling Act, a farmer can own 44 acres of unirrigated land and
22 acres of irrigated land. This ceiling varies from state to
state but it is certain that after creation of irrigation
facilities, there will be surplus land which government can
acquire for the purpose of resettlement.
4. Periodically Exposed Banks of Reservoir
Such land is fertile and mostly alluvial because of its
vicinity to the waterbody, and it is very productive for cash
crops such as vegetables, certain fruits like melons, pumpkin,
gourds etc. which are popular with tribal communities. Hence
such a land can be put to agricultural use before and after
the monsoon season.
5. Land in the Vicinity of Rivers or Rivulates Which has
Suffered Gully Erosion
This land can be put to use for cash crops as discussed
in the earlier case after reclamation. Reclamation will es-
sentially consist of embankments to stop further erosion.
This has been tried successfully in the state of Maharashtra
and has potential for success elsewhere.
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6. Saline Land Along the Seashore
There are large tracts of saline land in the littoral
states of India. Considerable efforts are going on to de-
salinate the land near the sea. This proposition has poten-
tial as other developmental schemes such as fishery, salt
making, etc. can be implemented along with a settlement.
7. Land Near Man-made Reservoirs
Government always acquires large tracts of land near
reservoirs for safety purposes and normally such land is not
put to agricultural use. Displaced people should be granted
right and priority to cultivate this land, which will easily
yield two crops in a year.
6:2:3 THE DEVELOPMENTAL OPTIONS
The most important aspect of resettlement is to engage
people in economic activities after relocation so that they
become self-sufficient and productive. If the guidelines
given above for resettlement are accepted, it should be pos-
sible to develop options which lead to improvements in stan-
dards of living and social services as well as positive action
to reverse the process of environmental degradation. Such
option would need careful planning and trial implementation.
The options given below are recommended as preliminary sugges-
tions on the basis of which it should be possible for a compe-
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tent agency to work out pilot projects. If successful, they
can eventually serve as demonstration centers. The develop-
ment options which satisfy the conditions may include:
- Social foresty
- Land reclamation
- Integrated agricultural development
- Crafts and cottage industries
- Job training and creating employment opportunities
- Reservoir development.
1. Social Forestry
Social forestry programs have mainly three components:
farm forestry encouraging farmers to plant trees on their own
farms by distributing free or subsidized seedlings; woodlots
planted by the Forest Department for the needs of the com-
munity especially along roadsides, canal banks and other such
public lands, and community woodlots planted by the communi-
ties themselves on community lands to be shared equally by
them.
In Gujarat, it is estimated that out of the total 1.95
million hectares of forest lands, nearly 1 million hectares
are in a degraded condition. Of these at least 0.64 million
hectares are in urgent need of reforestation. These one time
forests are in the vicinity of settlements and if these lands
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are made available to people's organizations for reforesta-
tion, a tremendous employment potential can be created. This
would require appropriate policy changes to enable them to
enjoy heritable rights, and with the provision of necessary
backup extension services it would go a long way towards the
enrichment of the environment.
In Ukai Project the forest land was cleared for resettle-
ment but due to the loss of forest cover the land lost its
fertility. Besides, the government did not initiate any
social forestry program until 1982 to engage people in
economic activities. This resulted in poverty and eventually
people who once preferred to dwell in forests were forced to
migrate to urban areas as labourers.
2. Land reclamation
Over 100 million hectares of land or nearly 25 percent of
the total area of India is barren and uncultivable. Such land
is either heavily eroded, with scarcely any soil cover left,
or saline and incapable of supporting much vegetation. While
such land is unfit for immediate resettlement of displaced
people and can not easily support economically viable forestry
operations, it offers a challenge to environmental en-
gineering. This challenge can be met by diverting sufficient
funds to support reclamation efforts by displaced people.
Given sufficiently attractive incentives a small mobile
brigade of planters can be set up whose task would be to
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reclaim otherwise unusable land and maintain a vegetation
cover on it.
In the state of Gujarat, for instance, there is a large
tract between firm land and the sea which is now total waste.
This vast tract of land can, in the future, be converted into
sweet land by planting mangroves and shrubs which will grow in
salt mud so that the general level of land can be raised
gradually with accumulation of silt and vegetation waste.
Similarly denuded hill slopes can be converted with hard
species which can thrive on rocky ground. Land in the
vicinity of rivers and rivulates which has suffered from gully
erosion can be terraced and levelled, and covered with eco-
nomically useful species of trees. In arid and saline areas,
drought resistent and salinity tolerant species can be planted
in blocks.
3. Integrated Agricultural Development
This would include, besides the cultivation of food
grains, vegetables and cash crops, horticulture, apiculture,
sericulture, animal husbandry, and dairy and poultry farming.
Three types of land may be found suitable for these opera-
tions. Of these, one - namely the periodically exposed banks
of rivers - is already used frequently for the cultivation of
melons, vegetables and other seasonal crops.
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Another type of land that can be used for intensive and
profitable agricultural development is land rendered excess
due to irrigation. Given much lower ceiling on irrigated land
as compared to that on unirrigated land, a certain area of
land should become available in the command area of every
irrigation project. Appropriate legislative measures should
be taken to prevent the dilution of land holdings in the
command area after irrigation and these should be strictly
implemented. The excess land acquired in the command area can
be redistributed among the displaced people. Thirdly, land on
the banks of rivers and rivulates which needs special protec-
tion from erosion should be used for orchards.and other types
of permanent and productive vegetation cover.
Among extra inputs that may be provided for this model
would be lift irrigation, facilities for cold storage and
packing, transportation, credit, and training.
4. Crafts and Cottage Industries
Tribal art in India is unique but with construction of
dams and irrigation it is losing its potential, Attention
should be given to the resettlement of artisans and people
engaged in cottage industries so that they continue their
activities in the relocated site. They should be also offered
special grants and other marketing facilities in order to
promote sales. Usually middlemen exploit tribals by pur-
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chasing their goods at very cheap prices and reselling them
with great profit. Government should form cooperatives to
safeguard the interest of tribal artisans,
In the Ukai Project there was no special effort made by
the government to conserve tribal art and crafts. As a result
several artisans, after resettlement, either changed their
activities and became agricultural labourers or migrated to
urban areas. There was no generous loan facility and
marketing infrastructure in the new settlement, which made
people lose their traditional avocation.
5. Job Training and Creating Employment Opportunities
Construction of any large-scale project is bound to bring
changes in the ecology of the region. Occurance of submersib-
le area will affect the landholders who will lose considerable
land. Construction activities will generate employment poten-
tial in government and non-government sectors where such af-
fected masses may find opportunities for employment. Often
tribals require training for different kinds of skilled, or
semi-skilled works and training institutions should be estab-
lished near the site so that people can attend the training
program without much difficulty. Attempts should be made to
provide training to the rural youth with a view towards
equiping them to take up jobs like welders, blacksmiths,
carpenters, bulldozer and tractor operators, truck drivers,
etc. The government should also assist them in setting up
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small-scale commercial and industrial enterprises. Employment
should be provided to at least one member of the displaced
family to insulate the family from forces tending to uproot
it. In order to ensure this, the members of the family should
first be put on the rolls of the project and if necessary,
sent for required training. If all displaced families cannot
be accommodated within the project, efforts should be made to
find jobs in other projects as well as in the state
governments.
In the Ukai Project, government arranged for the training
facilities but the program was not very successful mainly
because of the meagre stipend of Rs.30 per month offered to
the particpants. Besides, there was no placement service
after the training. The government failed to offer jobs to
the people. The result was frustration among the tribals and
eventually they preferred to become agricultural labourers.
The proposed Narmada Project would generate employment of
sizeable dimensions. It is estimated that around 28,000
workers with all kinds of skills will be needed in the next
fifteen years, but government has not initiated any training
program so far to help the displaced tribal community.
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6. Reservoir Development
The tremendous potential of man-made reservoirs for the
development of pisciculture is already known, and to a greater
or lesser extent, already tapped. This should be reinforced
by improving storage, packing and transportation facilities
and opening up more opportunities for the affected population
in every aspect of marketing.
The potential for the development of water borne trans-
port and communication network is equally promising and the
impact of communication development on the entire area, prac-
tically on every sector of economic activities can be substan-
tial. With growing interest in tourism, reservoir and the
area around can be also developed for recreational activities.
This could open various economic opportunities for the dis-
placed people.
In the Ukai Project, reservoir development was not
explored at all but government of Gujarat is exploring the
possibilities of pisciculture and navigation for Narmada
Project.
6:2:4 COMPARING ALTERNATIVES
The main aim of the alternatives proposed above is to
point to the possibility of combining a humane solution to the
problem of forced relocation with a new strategy of land use
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on economic development which will be more fruitful in the
long run. Though a detailed comparison of cost effectiveness
must await operationalization of these alternatives, it may be
safely asserted that such alternatives will not only cost less
but yield many more tangible benefits.
In order to operationalize alternative plans, the fol-
lowing aspects should be carefully considered.
1) Detailed sectoral plans for designing activity packets
for groups of different sizes. While the trend in planning is
generally away from sectoral planning to spatially and func-
tionally integrated area planning, it is necessary in the case
of forced relocation to devise sectoral plans for different
groups, without losing an integral perspective. The packet of
activities must be capable of enriching the environment, being
self-sustaining as far as possible, and suited for given
geographical zones.
2) An exhaustive and detailed list is required of
available locations in each geographic zone which need urgent
attention and can stand to benefit from schemes like those
described earlier. This would also include areas where
efforts can be made to counteract the impact of large-scale
conversion of land to nonagricultural uses, e.g., man-made
reservoirs and their catchment areas.
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3) Performance characteristics and cost-benefit analysis
of the sectoral plans. This would include employment poten-
tial, capital required, gestation period, social service com-
ponent and production targets. Ideally the plans should have
a high employment potential, low capital requirements, rela-
tively short gestation period, relatively low social service
needs, and high productivity.
The cornerstone of the resettlement policy should be that
land use must be geared towards environmental enrichment and
not degradation. Further, it should not cause social or
L4 4ai; di!Eruption but lead to an optimum use promoting
growth with justice. Hence it follows that the new land use
strategy arrests set use of land and promotes a more flexible
use.
6:2:5 ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISM TO IMPLEMENT RESETTLEMENT
POLICY
The Land Acquisition Act of 1894 is itself not sufficient
to deal with the problems of resettlement. Hence a comprehen-
sive resettlement policy should be formed at national level
which must be uniformally applied all over the nation.
There should be a central organization at the national
level to supervise and guide resettlement works of various
states. The organization should evaluate resettlement works
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from time to time and bring necessary modification in policy
implementation.
At present, resettlement is handled by the revenue
department of the concerned state. A separate organization
such as the "Directorate of Resettlement" must be created at
the state level to deal with the problems of resettlement
affected by large-scale development works.
At the district level there should be a resettlement
council where, besides government officials, members must be
selected from the affected villages, communities, voluntary
agencies involved in development works, and other social
leaders. This would be an advisory council and members will
participate in decision-making related to the choice of new
settlement, land acquisition, allotment of new land, compensa-
tion, design of the new village, etc. The prime task of this
council will be to initiate negotiation among concerned groups
to sort out the differences.
Often people have grievances against compensation, land
acquisition and land allotment. It will take a long time if
they resort to the standard Judiciary. Instead, there should
be a separate tribunal to look after such problems. This will
speed up the process and save time and money on the part of
plaintiff and government.
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The District Resettlement Council should follow the fol-
lowing process to implement resettlement policy effectively.
1. Planning
Resettlement officer should carry out a detailed survey
of the affected people and villages in the project area.
The Koel-Karo project is a case of gross injustice to the
people, as there is no correct number of affected people. The
survey should be conducted by the Directorate of Resettlement
and advance planning must be initiated such that the displaced
people are resettled as much as possible, not as individuals,
but as a community. Project report for resettlement of local
communities should be prepared well in advance, keeping in
view their present socio-economic status, cultural profile,
anthropology of perspective development, and their present
skills.
Based on this study the options/alternatives should be
planned for compensating the community. A detailed cost-
benefit study should be made at this stage to facilitate
decisionmaking. The entire planning process should involve
affected people from the very beginning so that they develop
faith in resettlement process.
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2. Communication
People should be communicated with about resettlement
plans from time to time, Often people are ignorant of their
own rights. Hence there should be open meetings and discus-
sions with the affected people to educate them about the
legalities of the Land Acquisition Act and resettlement plan.
The options prepared by the planners should be presented to
them to get their feedback. These inputs should be taken into
account while preparing final plans. Traditional ethnic and
religious leaders are usually respected by the people. Plan-
ners and administrators whenver possible seek their involve-
ment in planning relocation in order to facilitate communica-
tion, mobilization of group resources and cooperation. This
process of communication will take considerable time and ef-
fort but it should be implemented to achieve satisfactory
results.
3. Implementation
The District Resettlement Council should be in charge of
implementing the resettlement plan. The Council should draw
expertise from anthropologists, administrators, architects and
planners, and voluntary agencies and social workers in imple-
menting the program. The people should be kept informed of
the entire implementation procedure and the options open to
them. Any dispute at this stage should be resolved with the
help of the Resettlement Council.
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4. Evaluation and Monitoring
There should be continuous evaluation of the resettled
community and corrections should be made if people do not feel
comfortable with their new set up. The evaluation and
monitoring should continue for a long time even after people
are resettled. The study and experience gained here will be
very useful in the future while designing resettlement plans
for other projects.
6:3:0 CONCLUSION
India has the dubious distinction, among all the coun-
tries of the world, of having displaced the highest number of
people due to the construction of man-made reservoirs. In the
absence of a compendium of exact figures, it is difficult to
say exactly how many. However, it has been established that
from only ten selected river valley development projects, an
estimated 910,000 persons have been displaced in the post
independence era. The magnitude of forced relocations of the
population can be imagined considering that over 1,500 major
dams are being built in the country.
Several features involving the relocation of the popula-
tion, besides its scale, call for attention. One of the most
glaring of these is the inadequacy of the State's legal and
administrative machinery to handle the problems posed by
forced resettlement. Though man-made reservoirs are only one
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cause of forced relocation, it is one of the most discussed
one since it has received increasing attention from social
scientists, environmental activitists, and journalists. Many
others like the planned location of mines, industries, docks,
atomic or thermal power plants, firing ranges or weapons
testing zones, airports, new roads and railways, and urban
housing and commercial development, have meant the uprooting
of settled populations.
Generally resettlement policies are created by the state
governments, most often as knee-jerk reactions to the dis-
satisfaction of populations. In the case of the Ukai Dam
resettlement, policy consisted of about twenty different re-
solutions or decisions made by various departments of the
state government over a period of five to six years. Similar-
ly in the Sardar Sarovar Project on the Narmada, this process
is being repeated.
In the absence of a comprehensive policy governing reset-
tlement, this pattern of state governments offering too little
too late until they are forced to make further concessions -
by which time it is too late again - is bound to go on. Where
there is no public pressure, for example, when the affected
population is too backward or where there are no outside
groups with sufficient concern and clout, government may be
able to - and has been able to - get away by offering very
little. Consequently our efforts should not be exclusively to
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build up local pressures for contingent concessions, we must
at the same time strive to evolve a policy which will
eliminate the need for repeatedly building up local pressures.
Another feature which is common to resetttlement programs
throughout the country is the insufficient emphasis on pro-
viding alternative economic opportunities to the oustees. It
is assumed that once acquired assets have been compensated for
and alternative housing sites and social services have been
provided, the state's duty toward the displaced is done.
Though civic amenities and social services are important,
the tendency to favour them to the neglect of alternative
economic opportunities can not be allowed to go on. The
question of what the oustees will do after displacement is of
fundamental importance, and it should be tackled systematical-
ly.
There is an urgent need to study and document the
problems of resettled people in India. Very little work has
been done so far by the social scientists, planners and ad-
ministrators to evaluate the resettlement schemes which are
executed after the independence. The Sardar Sarovar Narmada
Project is now being implemented, and the lessons, experiences
of the settlement planning will be of great value in the
future.
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The nation has reached a stage where development can not
take place without the cooperation of people. The Koel-Karo
Project is not the only project where people have struggled
for justice, but the repercussions are being felt at many
places in the country. Many large-scale development projects
are stranded at the moment as the national government has
failed to evolve a satisfactory resettlement policy.
It is imminent then that a change in the legislative and
policy framework as well as the administrative apparatus is a
must for improving the state of affairs. What needs to be
done is to evolve an alternative framework of laws and
policies and to press for its adoption. It is equally neces-
sary to create the means for utilizing available expertise for
better training and orientation of the cadre of administrators
who handle resettlement progams throughout the country.
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APPENDIX I
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRIBAL PEOPLE
The term "Tribal people" refers here to ethnic groups
typically with stable, low-energy, sustained-yield economic
systems, as exemplified by hunter-gatherers, shifting or semi-
permanent farmers, herders, or fishermen. They exhibit in
varying degrees many of the following characteristics:
(a) geographically isolated or semi-isolated;
(b) unacculturated or only partially acculturated into the
societal norms of the dominant society;
(c) nonmonetized, or only partially monetized production
largely for subsistence, and independent of the national
economic system;
(d) ethnically distinct from the national society;
(e) nonliterate and without a written language;
(f) linguistically distinct from the wider society;
(g) identifying closely with one particular territory;
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(h) having an economic lifestyle largely dependent on the
specific natural environment;
(i) possessing indigenous leadership, but little or no
national representation, and few, if any, political rights as
individuals or collectively, partly because they do not
participate in the political process; and
(j) having loose tenure over their traditional lands, which
for the most part is not accepted by the dominant society or
accommodated by its courts; and having weak enforcement
capabilities against encroachers, even when tribal areas have
been delineated.
Partly as a result of these characteristics, most tribal
people do not receive all the national or local social
services - particurally health, communication, and education
services - normally available to other citizens. This lack
reinforces tribal people's low national status and limits
their capacity for change and adaptation to new circumstances.
Experience has shown that, unless special measures are
adopted, tribal people are more likely to be harmed than
helped by development projects that are intended for benefi-
ciaries other than themselves. Therefore, whenever tribal
people may be affected, the design of projects should include
measures or components necessary to safeguard their interests
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and, whenever feasible, to enhance their well-being. Sound
project planning and design reduce the risk that tribal people
will suffer from the project's consequences or disrupt its
implementation. More positively, tribal people may offer
opportunities to the wider society, especially by increasing
the national society's knowledge of proven adaptation to and
utilization of fragile and marginal environments.
Source: World Bank (1982), Tribal People and Economic Devel-
opments, Human Ecologic Consideration, Washington D.C.,
World Bank.
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APPENDIX II
GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION DATED MAY 1979
Land acquisition of area going
under submergence of Sardar
Sarovar and rehabilitation
of displaced persons.
Government of Guj arat
Narmada Development Department
Resolution No.RHB-1085-C
Sachivalaya, Gandhinager.
Dated the 1st November, 1985
Read: G.R.No.Misc. RES-1078-Amenities/Part-III/K-5, dt. 11-6-1979
PREAMBLE
The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, after hearing the
party States, issued directions regarding submergence, land
acquisition and rehabilitation of displaced persons from
Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. Taking into account the said
directions, the Government of Gujarat issued orders under the
Resolution dated 11th June 1979 noted above for granting
facilities at New places of resettlement to the oustees of
major and medium Projects. The Narmada Water Disputes
Tribunal has entrusted supervisory function over the construc-
tion of Sardar Sarovar Project to the Sardar Sarovar Construc-
tion Advisory Committee. The Narmada Control Authority is
also required to look after the acquisition of the lands going
under sumbergence compensation and rehabilitation and reset-
tlement of oustees. Moreover, the Sardar Sarovar (Narmada)
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Project was posed to the World Bank for assistance and on 10th
May 1985 an agreement with the World Bank has also been signed
for obtaining assistance for the execution of Sardar Sarovar
Dam and Power House Works. The issues relating to rehabilita-
tion have been discussed in the Narmada Control Authority,
Sardar Sarovar Construction Advisory Committee and with the
World Bank Missions. They have recommended that the facili-
ties to be extended to the oustees of Sardar Sarovar (Narmada)
Project from Gujarat should be the same as are extended to the
oustees from Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh. The World Bank
has also in its agreement inter-alia provided that the oustees
from the State of Gujarat, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the
State of Maharashtra shall be relocated and rehabilitated
pursuant to the provisions of the Narmada Water Disputes
Tribunal and to the following principles and objectives:
1. The main objectives of the plan for resettlement and
Rehabilitation of the Oustees are to ensure that the
oustees shall, promptly after their displacement:
(i) improve or at least regain the standard of living
they were enjoying prior to their displacement; (ii) be
relocated as village units, village sections or families
in accordance with the Oustee's preference; (iii) be fully
integrated in the community to which they are resettled
and (iv) be provided with appropriate compensation and
adquate social and physical rehabilitation infrastructure,
including community services and facilities.
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2. The plan for Resettlement and Rehabilitation of the
Oustees shall ensure adequate participation by the
Oustees.
3. Each landed Oustee shall be entitled to and allotted
irrigable land in the State in which he chooses to reset-
tle, of equal size to that which he owned prior to his
resettlement, subject to the applicable land ceiling laws,
acceptable to him; provided however, that in those cases
where the Oustee owned less than 2 hectares of land, such
Oustee shall be entitled to at least 2 hectares of Ir-
rigable land, acceptable to him. For purposes of this
paragraph, the term "State" means individually Gujarat,
Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra.
4. Each landless Oustee shall be rehabilitated in the agri-
cultural or non-agricultural sectors, as the case may be,
and shall be entitled to stable means of livelihood in
accordance with the objectives set forth hereinabove.
5. The level of compensation for land, irrigable and other-
wise, to be paid to landed Oustees shall be based on the
current market value of land of equivalent size, location
and comparable quality in areas provided for and acceptab-
le to each oustee.
6. Where irrigable land is allocated to a landed Oustee in
lieu of land previously owned by such Oustee, 50% of the
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cash compensation to which such Oustee is entitled shall
be applied towards the cost of the allocated land, subject
to a maximum of the value of the land, allotted, and the
balance of the cost of such allotted land shall be treated
by the State where the allotted land is located, as an
interest-free loan repayable over 20 years. For purposes
of this paragraph, "State" means individually Gujarat,
Madhaya Pradesh and Maharashtra.
7. In no case shall cash payments be made in substitution for
actual rehabilitation. Cash payments shall be restricted
to such to such transactions as mandated by the Decision.
Taking into consideration the aforesaid, the Government
of Gujarat resolves as under:
RESOLUTION
Government is pleased to resolve that acquisition of the
private lands going under submergence of Sardar Sarovar and
Rehabilitation of the displaced persons as a result of such
submergence from the area in Gujarat shall be governed by the
following directions:
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1. DEFINITIONS
a) "Land". The expression "land" shall have the same
meaning as defined in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (herein-
after referred to as the Act) which states "the expression
'land' includes benefits to arise out of land and things
attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything
attached to the earth".
(b) "Oustees". An 'oustee' shall mean any person who
since at least one year prior to the date of publication of
the notification under Section 4 of the Act, has been ordin-
arily residing or cultivating land or carrying on any trade,
occupation or calling or working for gain in the area likely
to be submerged permanently or temporarily.
(c) "Family" (i) A family shall include husband, wife
and minor children and other persons dependent on the head of
the family, e.g. widowed mother (ii) Every major son will be
treated as a separate family.
II. LANDS WHICH ARE TO BE COMPULSORILY ACQUIRED
(a) All the lands within Gujarat of private ownership
situated below FRL - 138.68 mts. (455 ft.) of Sardar Sarovar
and all interests therein shall be acquired for Sardar Sarovar
Project under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
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1894. If on the basis aforesaid, 75% or more land of a con-
tiguous holding of any person is required to be compulsorily
acquired, such person shall have option to compel compulsory
acquisition of the entire contiguous holding.
(b) All buildings with their appurtenant land situated
between FRL + 138.68 mtrs. (455 fts) and MWL + 140.21 mtrs.
(S460 ft.) as also those affected by the back water effect
resulting from MWL + 140.21 mtrs. (460 ft.) shall also be
acquired for Sardar Sarovar Project under the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
III. GRANTS AND AMENTITIES
The following grants and amenities will be provided to
the oustees:
(a) Resettlement Grants (Rehabilitation Grant) - A sum
of Rs.750/- per family inclusive of transportation charges as
resettlement grant.
(b) Grant-in-aid.
Where total compensation
is received Grant-in-aid
Above Rs.2000/- Nil
Between Rs.2000/- and Rs.500/- less an amount
Rs. 500/- equal to 1/3 of the
compensation in excess
of Rs.500/-
Less than Rs. 500/- Rs. 550/-
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(c) Civic amenities:
1. Primary school (3 rooms) for 100 families
2. One panchayat Ghar for every 500 families
3. One dispensary for every 500 families
4. One seed store for every 500 families
5. One Children's park for every 500 families
6. One village pond for every 500 families.
7. Drinking water well with through for every 50 families
8. Each colony shaould be linked to main road by roads
of appropriate standard.
9. One platform for every 50 families
10. Every oustee family shall be entitled to and allotted
a house sit. i.e. a plot of land measuring 18.29 x
27.43 m (60' x 90) free of cost. In addition, a
provision of 30% additional area for roads, Govern-
ment buildings, open space etc. shall be made under
civic amenties.
IV. ALLOTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS
Every displaced family from whom more than 25% of its
land holding is acquired (hereinafter referred to as oustee
agricultural family) shall be entitled to and be allotted
irrigable land to the extent of land acquired from it subject
to the prescribed ceiling the the Gujarat State and a minimum
of 2 hectares (5 acres) per family. This land shall be trans-
ferred to the oustee agricultural family if it agrees to take
it. Of the price to be paid for the land a sum equal to 50%
of the compensation payable to the oustee agricultural family
168
for the land acquired from it will be set off as an initial
installment of payment. The balance cost of the allotted land
shall be recovered from the allottee in 20 yearly install-
ments, free of interest.
Each oustee agricultural family shall be offered lands
entitled to it at three different places from the lands vested
in the Revenue Department and in the Irrigation Department of
the Government of Gujarat, from the lands available to the
Govt. of Gujarat under the Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling
Act and from the scattered lands that may be available as a
result of acquisition in the command of Sardar Sarovar
Project. For the said purpose, the acquisition in the command
of the Sardar Sarovar Project will be made, as far as prac-
ticable according to the provisions, which will be worked out
having regard to the size of holding and, it will be more or
less similar on the lines of Part II Schedule A of the Maha-
rashtra Resettlement of Project Displaced Persons Act, 1976.
Moreover, complete details of the lands available with the
Government for allotment to the oustee agricultural family
will be maintained in the office of the Rehabilitation Officer
at Kevadia and the affected agricultural family may also
suggest the lands acceptable to him for allotment.
In all the cases where offer of lands by Government is
acceptable to the oustee agricultural family or where the
oustee agricultural family is able to select lands from the
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lands available with the Government the extent of land to be
transferred to it shall be the extent of land acquired from it
subject to the prescribed ceiling in Gujarat State and a
minimum of 2 hectares per oustee agricultural family.
V. PURCHASE OF PRIVATE LAND BY OUSTEE AGRICULTURAL FAMILY
In case, however, the lands offered to the affected
agricultural family are not acceptable to it and it is also
not in a position to suggest any alternative land that may be
allotted to it after examining the details with the Govern-
ment, the Government would help those affected oustee agricul-
tural families in purchase of private land from the amount of
compensation payable to them through a Committee appointed by
the Government for the said purpose.
VI. EX-GRATIA PAYMENT
The compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, for the acquisition of land going under submergence and
the market value of the land of equal size (subject to the
prescribed ceiling under Gujarat Agricultural Land Ceiling
Act), location and comparable quality in the areas where the
agricultural land is purchased by the oustee agricultural
family through committee specified in paragraphs V. shall be
examined case by case basis and the difference if any, in
price of land so purchased and the amount of compensation
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shall be paid to the oustee agricultural family as an ex-
gratia payment.
VII. REHABILITATION OF LANDLESS FAMILIES
The Director, Resettlement, Narmada Project, will prepare
a list of landless families who require Government help in
seeking employment. He would prepare schemes and offer em-
ployment after laying down modalities for the same in co-
ordination with local officers implementing programmes such as
National Rural Employment Programme (NREP), Integrated Rural
Development Programme (IRDP) & Tribal Area Sub-plan.
VIII. ADJUSTMENT NECESSARY FOR OUSTEES OF SARDAR SAROVAR
PROJECT REHABILITATED PRIOR TO ISSUE OF THESE ORDERS
All the affected persons from the area in Gujarat going
under submergence of Sardar Sarovar rehabilitated so far will
also be entitled to the aforesaid rehabilitation and resettle-
ment facilities. Any entitlement in view of the difference in
the orders dt. 11th June 1979 and these orders shall be im-
mediately made available to oustees.
The issues with the concurrence of Finance Department
dated 21-10-85 obtained on this department file of even
number.
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By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat.
T. V. Krishnamurthay
Secretary to the Government
Narmada Development Department
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APPENDIX III GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION DATED MAY 1985
Ex-gratia payment to oustees
who are unauthorisedly
cultivating Revenue Kharaba
lands/Forest land going under
submergence in Sardar Sarovar
Government of Guj arat
Narmada Development Department
Resolution No.RHB-NMD-7082-48-K-5
Sachivalaya, Gandhinager.
Dated the 30th May, 1985
A question of making ex-gratia payment to oustees unauth-
orisedly cultivating Government waste land and forest land and
who have unauthorisedly constructed houses on Government waste
land as well as on forest land going under submergence in
Sardar Sarovar was under the consideration of Government for
some time.
RESOLUTION
After careful consideration Government has resolved as
under:
Those oustees who are unauthorisedly cultivating
Government waste land/forest land going under submergence in
Sardar Sarovar on the date on which notification under Section
4 of Land Acquisition Act has been issued for acquisition of
private lands going under submergence of Sardar Sarovar.
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(a) They will be given ex-gratia payment for the land being
unauthorisedly cultivated at the rate at which the
compensation is being paid for acquisition of private
lands;
(b) they will be offered land for cultivation to the extent
of land being cultivated subject to minimum of three
acres and maximum of five acres for every individual
married son and will be alloted if he is willing to
accept.
2. Moreover, in case of houses constructed unauthorisedly on
Government waste land/Forest land the oustees shall be paid
full value of the building as per valuation. However, no
payment or compensation will be made for the land
unauthorisedly occupied by them for construction of the house.
They will be allowed to take away dismantled materials of
their houses.
3. This issues with the concurrence of the Finance
Department and Revenue Department dated 15.5.85 and 6.2.85
respectively on this department file of even number.
By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat.
I.M. Shah
Secretary (Construction & Coordination)
Narmada Development Department
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APPENDIX IV GOVERNMENT RESOLUTTON DATED FEBRUARY 198e
Fixation of subsidy norms for
resettlement and development
schemes for Sardar Sarovar
oustees.
Government of Gujarat
Narmada Development Department
Resolution No.MISC-1086 (3)C
Sachivalaya, Gandhinager.
Dt.21.2.1986
RESOLUTION
The rehabilitation of oustees of Sardar Sarovar (Narmada)
is to be done as per the provisions of the Resolution dated
1.11.85. In order to enable the oustee families to regain or
raise their standard of economic living following their set-
tlement Government of Gujarat intends to cover them under
various productive schemes such as Agriculture, Cottage Indus-
tries, Minor Irrigation, Animal Husbandry, Fisheries, Forest
Development etc. It has been experienced that most of the
oustees are poor tribals, hence they do not come forward to
obtain loan. They are also not able to repay the installment
of loan because of their weak economic conditions. In the
circumstances, most of the tribal oustees remain deprived of
the benefits of these schemes. After careful consideration,
Government therefore felt that unless norms of subsidy are not
revised on higher side, tribal oustees cannot take benefit.
After careful consideration Government therefore decided to
grant special assistances to the tribal oustees of Sardar
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Sarevar Project who are eligible to get 50% subsidy under
tribal areas subplan scheme as follows:
1. Maximum 75% subsidy to agricultural tribal oustee family
of Sardar Sarovar Project, subject to maximum of Rs.5000 per
family.
2. Maximum 90% subsidy to landless tribal oustee family, in
individual cases where 10% contribution is not paid by
tribals, then 100% subsidy.
The assistance will be paid by the Director, Resettlement
and Development after individual verification of the cases.
This issues with concurrence of Special Secretary and
Financial Adviser (Narmada) on this Department file of even
No. dated 14.2.1986.
By order and in the name of the Governor of Gujarat.
K. G. Vansara
Section Officer
Narmada Development Project
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